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《國立彰化師範大學文學院學報》

總　編　序

台灣疫情宥靖，廿二期文學院學報無畏新冠肺炎的全球肆虐，於防疫的辛苦期間，仍廣受各方先達不輟賜稿，提供各方領域的學術研究成果，讓知識能夠自由交流。此誠學報持續經營之動力，深感殊幸。

本學報順利地於 11 月完成出版，於此，特別感謝國文系蘇慧霜教授在百忙萬機之中應允持續擔任學報主編。蘇教授為詩學領域精銳，不僅以豐富之編輯經驗盡心規劃本學報之出刊流程，更費神帶領助理執行繁瑣的編輯校對工作，使本期學報學術品質益臻善美，敦使學報順利付梓。亦感謝本學報之編輯委員，周而復始投入嚴謹的編輯會議，在審查工作與未來展望上不餘遺力地提供卓見，俾使學報在出刊品質臻緻日上。再者，更感謝為本學報匿名審查的專家學者，耐心對於每一份稿件進行審慎檢視，竭力提供不同面向的研究建議。

《國立彰化師大文學院學報》創刊自民國 91 年，歷經 18 載，雖中途曾有停刊的阻礙，幾經院內師長們之努力復興，至 101 年開始復刊。吾人已第二回擔任學報總編，自是承接學報發展之大責;除試圖延續前任總編們努力經營之成果外，更多方爭取優秀作品及相關經費挹注。茲此，編輯委員更集思將本刊推向國內核心期刊，讓本刊不僅是學報，更是薈萃各方文學院相關知識與研究成果之寶地，讓各相關領域專家學者藉本學報進行活潑的學術交流。期待不久的將來，本學報終能成為一優質之數位化國際期刊，為學術界貢獻棉薄之力。

《國立彰化師範大學文學院學報》總編

文學院院長　黃聖慧　謹誌

中華民國 109 年 10 月

主 編 的 話

《彰師大文學院學報》創刊於 2002 年，每年兩期公開徵稿，在嚴謹的外審機制之下，已然成為具有公信力的學術發表平台。

第 22 期計有 5 篇來稿，經過嚴謹的外審，歷經三審評閱，加上一篇特邀稿，第 22 期共刊登 4 篇論文，分別為：

1. 陳松長：〈《蒼頡篇》與「書同文」再議〉（特邀稿）
2. 盧莉茹：〈境改變與生態惡化：十九世紀英美旅行者筆下的福爾摩沙〉（中山外文教授兼系主任）
3. 龔詩堯：〈《中國英雄》於歐洲之初期傳播研究〉（高師大助理教授）
4. 蔡長蓁：〈道作為習慣與組成：史賓諾沙式閱讀《老子》〉（臺大外國語文學系博士生）

學術期刊出版越來越艱難，一則出版印刷經費不足，再則稿源不多，不論主客觀環境均考驗出版單位的堅持，本期學報能如期出版，感謝總編的奔走籌措金源，感謝學報編輯委員與文學院編輯助理小組同仁們的襄助，感謝校外審查委員審稿並惠賜卓見，這些溫暖，使繁冗的編務成為感恩的記憶。

學術引領知識的流行，這是本學報努力的目標，更重視論文的學術價值、創新性、邏輯性，不論是學術寬度與深度，期待更多精闢論說的投入發表，本學報將秉持兼容的理念，廣納各方論說，期待不斷堅持的出版。

《國立彰化師範大學文學院學報》第廿二期主編

國文學系教授 蘇慧霜 謹誌

中華民國 109 年 10 月

國立彰化師範大學文學院學報

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《蒼頡篇》與「書同文」再議

陳松長*

提要

本文通過對上世紀以來出土的漢簡《蒼頡篇》抄本的字體的比對分析，認為秦代李斯等所作蒼頡三篇所用的字體就是當時的通用字體，即日常官府文書中所常用的秦隸，而不是許慎所說的小篆。進而推論秦代所推行的「書同文」，也就是用「秦文」統一六國文字，所謂「秦文」在班固看來是「秦篆」，在現在看來就是「秦隸」。

關鍵詞：漢簡、蒼頡篇、小篆、秦篆、秦隸

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研究方向：出土簡帛與秦漢史。

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The Reconsideration on *Cangjiepian* and "all writing with the same characters"

Chen Songchang

Abstract

Through an analysis on writings of the Han manuscript *Cangjiepian* written on bamboo slips and excavated last century, the paper argues that the *Cangjie* three chapters written by Li Si and others used the common script of their time, namely the Qin clerical script used in the daily official documents rather than the small seal script characterized by Xu Shen. The paper further infers that "all writings with the same characters" initiated in Qin was that Qin used their script to standardize scripts of the six states. Therefore, in Bangu's view, "Qin script" as "Qin seal script"; while for us that was "Qin clerical script".

Key Words: Ham bamboo slips, *Cangjiepian*, small seal script, Qin seal script, Qin clerical script

眾所周知，《蒼頡篇》是繼《史籀篇》之後的又一部識字課本，同時也是秦相李斯為「書同文」而撰著的一部文字著作。但比較遺憾的是，秦代的《蒼頡篇》早已佚失，故其到底是什麼樣貌，至今仍不太清楚。王國維在《重輯蒼頡篇序》中指出，「蒼頡三篇雖並於漢，亡于唐，然漢初所定五十五章三千三百字，今散見於諸書所引者，尚得十之五六，乾嘉以來，孫、任諸家相繼纂輯，並有成書，近時陶、陳諸氏補之，其字益備。余嘗取諸家之書讀之，竊怪其勤於搜集而疏於體裁，詳於注解而略于本文也。夫古字書存於今日者在漢唯《急就》、《說文解字》，在六朝唯《千字文》與《玉篇》耳，此四種中，《說文》與《玉篇》，說字形者為一類，《急就》、《千文》便諷誦者又為一類。《蒼頡》一書據劉子政、班孟堅、許叔重所說與近出敦煌殘簡，其與《急就》《千文》為類而不與《說文》《玉篇》為類審矣。」[1]王國維認為，「蒼頡三篇雖並於漢，亡于唐」，這也就是說，早在唐代，蒼頡三篇就已經亡佚了，故後人重輯《蒼頡篇》只能從漢代的《急就》、《說文》和六朝的《千字文》、《玉篇》中去輯佚了。

特別需要指出的是，在王國維所處的民國時期，除了典籍文獻之外，僅有零星的敦煌漢簡可資研究，但他已敏銳地發現，《蒼頡》一書「與《急就》、《千文》為類而不與《說文》、《玉篇》為類審矣」。這也就告訴我們，《蒼頡篇》並不是講字形一類的書，而是「便諷誦」的字書，也就是現在所說的文字識讀課本。

自上世紀 70 年代以來，地不愛寶，已在全國不同的地方相繼出土了上十種漢簡《蒼頡篇》的抄本，這些抄本雖大多是殘篇斷簡，但畢竟給我們提供了比王國維所處時代豐富得多的原始資料，這對重新認識《蒼頡篇》的書體特徵，重新認識它在「書同文」過程中的文字本相，有著明顯而重要的佐證價值。

現在所知，最早發現漢簡中有《蒼頡篇》的是英籍匈牙利人斯坦因，他在敦煌漢代遺址中首次發現了《蒼頡篇》的殘簡，其中一部分於 1914 年為羅振玉、王國維在《流沙綴簡》一書中刊佈。其後在額濟納河流域的居延(1930 年)、居延破城子(1972 年-1976 年)、玉門花海(1977 年)、敦煌馬圈灣(1979 年)、新疆尼雅(1993 年)等地陸續發現有《蒼頡篇》的殘文，雖然這些都是斷簡殘篇，但也足以說明《蒼頡篇》在漢代確實是一種常見的文字讀本。

除了西北漢簡之外，1977 年在安徽阜陽雙古堆西漢汝陰侯墓中出土了一組《蒼頡篇》竹簡，其保存文字多達 541 個，該墓的下葬年代為漢文帝 15 年(公元前 165 年)，由是可知這是現在所知抄寫年代最早的《蒼頡篇》抄本。2008 年，甘肅永昌洪山窯鄉水泉子村的 5 號漢墓中又出土了 140 餘枚西漢晚期的木簡《蒼頡篇》，儘管這批簡多殘損，但仍存有可讀文字約 970 個，且文本還是七言本，這對研究《蒼頡篇》在漢代的流變意義重大。2009 年，北大入藏的西漢簡中，再一次發現了西漢中期的竹簡《蒼頡篇》，雖然不是完本，但也保存了 1300 餘字，且保存狀況相當不錯，這又給《蒼頡篇》的研究提供了存字最多，時代較早的研究文本。

現在所知已出土的漢簡《蒼頡篇》大約有 10 餘種(還包括英國國家圖書館所藏「柿片」中的殘文等)，這裡我們且不具體討論西北漢簡《蒼頡篇》殘本的準確年代，單從墓葬出土的三批《蒼頡篇》漢簡來說，其時代最早的是漢文帝十五年(公元前 165)以前

[1] 見《王國維遺書》(上海書店出版社，1983 年版)，卷七，頁 1。

的抄本，而北大漢簡和水泉子漢簡分別是西漢中期和晚期的抄本，它們正可與阜陽漢簡《蒼頡篇》構成西漢早、中、晚的時代序列，應該說是代表了西漢時期《蒼頡篇》流傳使用的基本情況，展示了西漢時期所用《蒼頡篇》的文字體貌。可令人困惑的是，現在出土的漢簡《蒼頡篇》，竟沒有一篇或一章是用篆書抄寫的，居然全部都是隸書，就是現在所知最早的抄本阜陽漢簡《蒼頡篇》(見圖一)也是用馬王堆一號漢墓出土遣策類簡牘(見圖二)書體基本相同的古隸所抄寫，而這種古隸的書體特征又與睡虎地秦簡、里耶秦簡一脈相承。由此，我們大致可以推想，李斯作《蒼頡篇》時所用的字體就應該是現在所看到的睡虎地秦簡、里耶秦簡一樣的秦隸，因為現在所看到的秦簡文字實際上就是秦代的通用字體，李斯作《蒼頡篇》以「罷其不與秦文合者」，自然是用當時的通用字體去統一六國文字，如果他是用小篆去統一六國文字，那不僅是小篆的構型特征與六國文字相差甚遠，而且其載體也極不便於普及和推廣，並且，如果李斯是用小篆去作《蒼頡篇》的話，那麼，據李斯所作《蒼頡篇》時代僅差 50 年不到的阜陽漢簡怎麼可能不用小篆抄寫而用古隸抄寫呢？如果或以為這就是隸變的結果的話，那未免將隸變的情況看得太簡單了。

一般認為，所謂「隸變」就是從小篆演變為隸書的過程。其實，現在已有很多學者專門討論過這個有點攪不清的問題，因為大量的出土材料已經證明，隸書的緣起已可追溯到春秋末期的侯馬盟書，而所謂小篆卻是漢代才有的概念，兩者之間不太可能是一種衍生關係。因此，有學者就指出，「小篆與古隸乃是『一體二用』」，「一體是說小篆與古隸在構形理據上沒有什麼區別，它們實際上是一種字體。『二用』是說這兩者分別有不同的使用範圍和場合；不同的使用範圍和場合又決定了它們不同的面目。小篆是在古隸的基礎上，加以工藝美術的美化而成，古隸是手寫體，小篆是美術體。」[2] 這種認識，並非孤論。有學者也指出：「秦簡文字是秦國、秦代唯一書寫應用的字體，秦代刻石文字是篆文美術字，否認當時已有秦篆、秦隸二種書法字體同時存在並用，而秦篆、漢隸是長期衍化一脈相傳，因時代差異所逐漸形成的。」[3] ，這也就說，所謂的「秦篆」與「秦隸」的同時存在並用是不存在的，從字體上來說，它們就是一種字體，只是其載體和功用不同而已。因此，所謂從小篆到隸書的「隸變」其本質也就是「秦篆」或「秦隸」本身的變化而已，並不是一般所解讀的從小篆到隸書的演變。

基於這種認識，我們再來看看許慎在《說文解字敘》中有關《蒼頡篇》的一段名言：「秦始皇帝初兼天下，丞相李斯乃奏同之，罷其不與秦文合者。斯作《蒼頡篇》，中車府令趙高作《爰曆篇》，太史令胡毋敬作《博學篇》，皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改，所謂小篆者也。」[4]

千百年來的解釋都認為，李斯等作《蒼頡篇》等的目的就是為了「罷其不與秦文合者」，而其編撰的方法則是「皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改」，其文字即「所謂小篆者也」。

與此大意相近者有班固在《漢書・藝文志》中所說，《蒼頡》等篇「文字多取《史

[2] 靳永：《書法研究的多重證據法：文物、文獻與書跡的綜合釋證》(齊魯書社，2008 年)，頁 56。
[3] 林進忠：《戰國中晚期秦文字的書法體勢辨析》，載《近百年出土書跡國際學術研討會論文集》(台灣中華書道學會，2008 年)，頁 93-130。
[4] 許慎：《說文解字》(中華書局，2002 年版)，頁 315。

籀篇》，而篆體複頗異，所謂秦篆者也。」[5]

仔細比對可以發現，兩說相同的是「取《史籀篇》」，許慎說是「皆取」，班固說是「多取」，儘管略有範圍的差異，但有一點是共同的，即《蒼頡篇》的內容和文字都是取自《史籀篇》。不同的是，許慎說是「或頗省改」，然後說這種省改後的文字就是「所謂小篆者也」。這種解釋，好像一直都沒人懷疑過，以致都認為，李斯所作《蒼頡篇》所用的字體就是「所謂小篆者也。」其實，這種解釋可能並不是許慎的原意，因為這裡所講的內容是說李斯等三篇的內容和文字的構型取捨，並不是給其字體下一個定義，故在「皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改」之後突然來一句「所謂小篆者也」，本身就比較突兀。倒是班固的認識倒是在給其字體下定義：「篆體復頗異，所謂秦篆者也。」所謂「篆體」，應該就是他所看到的《蒼頡篇》的文字形態，他沒有說「或頗省改」，而只是說其「篆體復頗異」，是「所謂秦篆者也」，班固所認為「頗異」的篆體，應該就是以他所處時代的篆書概念來衡量的，故他認為這這種形體頗異的篆體是「所謂秦篆者也」。

這裡，我們當先理清一下這些概念的確定內涵才可進一步展開討論。

首先，所謂「史籀大篆」到底是什麼字體？班固在《漢書・藝文志》中注曰：「周宣王時太史作大篆十五篇，建武時亡六篇矣」[6]。這也就是說，所謂「大篆」，也就是《史籀篇》的文字，這一點，許慎的解釋也是一樣的：「及宣王太史籀著大篆十五篇」。但我們知道，《史籀篇》的文字還有另一個專稱，即「籀文」，從字面上解釋，所謂「籀文」，就應該是《史籀篇》所用的文字，這我們也可以從許慎的《說文解字敘》中略知一二，他說「太史籀著大篆十五篇，與古文或異。」也就是說，史籀大篆只是與古文稍有差異而已。他在概述《說文》體例是說：「今敘篆文，合以古籀」，也是將古文與籀文並列，可見，在許慎看來，所謂史籀大篆，也就是籀文。儘管他並沒有對「大篆」進行解釋，也沒有單列「籀文」一詞，但他在《說文解字》所收的 9353 個字頭下，標明「籀文」者共有 225 個，而其所收的字體，以現在文字學的眼光來審視，那確實是「與古文或異」而已。因為在大徐本的《說文解字》中，我們所看到的「籀文」和「古文」都是帶有懸針筆法的字體，與線條圓轉的篆書和「或體」有明顯的區別，而「籀文」與「古文」的差異主要表現在構型部件的不同而已，如果現在所看到的大徐本《說文》基本保存了漢代文字特點的話，那許慎所說的「大篆」就是指「籀文」，而「籀文」也就是「與古文或異」的一種字體而已。

其次，許慎所說的「小篆」和班固所說的「秦篆」有什麼區別嗎？按《說文解字敘》的解釋：「篆書即小篆，秦始皇帝使下杜人程邈所作也。」[7]按現在所看到的徐鉉本《說文解字》來看，其字體是以構型縱長，線條婉轉流暢為特征的一種字體，它與「古文」和「籀文」有明顯的差異和區別，故許慎在收錄字形時是「今敘篆文，合以古籀」，很明顯是將其分為三種字體歸類分析的。至於「秦篆」，從字面意義來理解，就應該是秦代的篆書，這一點，徐鍇在註解《說文解字敘》中的程邈作小篆時，也說到了「秦篆」，他說：「李斯雖改史篇為秦篆而程邈復同作也。」也就是說，所謂「秦篆」就是李斯根據史籀篇所改定的篆書。但班固卻認為，「篆體復頗異」，在班固看來，

[5] 見《漢書・藝文志》(中華書局 1962 年版)，頁 1721。
[6] 《漢書・藝文志》(中華書局，1962 年版)，頁 1719。
[7] 《說文解字》(中華書局，2002 年版)，頁 315。

這並不是小篆，因為其「篆體復頗異」，故他認為是「秦篆」。這多少告訴我們，至少在漢代，人們對小篆的認識是不一樣的，而秦篆也並不是徐鉉所收進《說文》中的小篆。那麼，「秦篆」的特征如何呢？班固沒有展開說明，只是說與篆體有很大的差異。因此，我們也許還需要對篆書有一个明確的認知。

篆書之名是漢代才出現的字體名稱，秦代以前（包括秦代）「篆」這個詞完全沒有作為書體用的例子。

如《周禮・春官・巾車》：「服車……孤乘夏篆」，鄭玄注：「故書『夏篆』作『夏緣』。鄭司農云：『夏，赤也；緣，綠色。或曰：夏篆，篆讀為圭瑑之瑑，夏篆，轂有約也。』玄謂夏篆，五彩畫轂約也。」[8]是知「篆」指古代車輪上的紋飾。

《周禮・考工記・凫氏》：「鐘帶謂之篆」[9]，可見鐘帶上的紋飾也叫「篆」。

楊雄《法言・吾子篇》：「童子雕蟲篆刻，壯夫不為」，蔣禮鴻先生說：「篆刻者，篆亦刻也，乃瑑字之借。《漢書・董仲舒傳》：『良玉不瑑』，顏注：『瑑，謂篆刻為文也。音篆。』是其證也。」[10]

裘錫圭先生指出：「秦代大概只有『篆』這種字體名稱。《說文》訓『篆』為『引書』，其義不明。『篆』跟『瑑』同音，『瑑』是『雕刻為文』的意思(《漢書・董仲舒傳》顏師古注。『文』指花紋、紋樣)，古代『篆』、『瑑』二字可以通用。《呂氏春秋・慎勢》：『功名著於槃（盤）盂，銘篆著於壺鑑』，『銘篆』猶言『銘刻』，頗疑篆文之『篆』當讀為『瑑』。隸書是不登大雅之堂的字體，篆文可以銘刻金石，所以得到了『瑑』這個名稱。」[11]

篆書之名從銘刻而得來之說，已得到許多出土材料的印證。現在所知的篆書資料，絕大部分都是銘刻在金石上的文字，其大宗如商周以來的青銅器銘文、戰國秦漢的璽印文字和秦漢碑刻、詔版等，都是銘刻而成。這些銘刻而成的文字，要不就是銘記功名，要不就是頒佈詔令，都是在非常莊重正規的場合使用的文字，大多帶有官方的色彩，且銘刻的時間較長，不允許有急就潦草率意的情況出現，因此，在文字的構形上需要嚴格的對稱工穩，在線條的運用上需要高度圓轉整飭等，這樣也就形成了篆書那種體勢修長，線條圓轉、結構工穩，字相整飭端莊的特殊字體。

如果上述有關篆書的認知沒有多大問題的話，那麼，班固所說的蒼頡等篇「篆體復頗異」就應該是指他所看到的《蒼頡篇》的字體與漢代所認知的篆書是有差異的，故他以「秦篆」稱之。由此我們也大致可以知道，東漢時期的所謂篆書，應該就是許慎《說文》中所收的篆文，而所謂「秦篆」，就應該是與這類篆書「頗異」的一種字體。由此我們再來看許慎給《蒼頡篇》所下的文字定義，至少有一點與班固相左，即許慎認為的「小篆」，而班固認為是「秦篆」。這一字之差，千百年來並沒引起多大的關注，故一般都認為李斯是以小篆編寫了《蒼頡篇》，是用小篆統一了六國文字。

現在看來，不僅是自上世紀以來不斷出土的簡牘抄本《蒼頡篇》字體否定了這種認知，而且對許慎所說的「斯作《蒼頡篇》，中車府令趙高作《爰曆篇》，太史令胡毋

8 (清)孫詒讓：《周禮正義》(中華書局，1987 年版)，頁 2180。
9 (清)孫詒讓：《周禮正義》(中華書局　，1987 年版)，頁 3261。
10 蔣禮鴻：《義府續貂》(中華書局，1981 年版)，頁 7。
11 裘錫圭：《文字學概要》(商務印書館，1988 年版)，頁 66。

敬作《博學篇》，皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改，所謂小篆者也。」這句話，也許還有重新討論的空間，或者說至少可以有不同的解釋。

首先，這裡所說的「秦文」，就應該是秦代當時所通用的文字，這種通用文字也就是秦代官府、民間日常所用的文字，睡虎地秦簡和里耶秦簡正是當時官府日常行政運作中所書寫的文獻和文書，這些保存至今的秦簡文字就應該是標準的「秦文」。李斯奏請「罷其不與秦文合者」，也就是要以「秦文」來統一六國文字，故他們所編撰的識字課本，自然也應該是用「秦文」來編撰，而不可能是「所謂小篆者也」。

其次，對於「皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改，所謂小篆者也」的解讀早就有不同的聲音。有關「或頗省改」之說，許慎認為李斯等人所作是以「史籀大篆」為基礎，略微做了一些省改而成，裘錫圭先生就指出，這種說法是不妥當的，因為「籀文並不是秦國統一全中國前夕所用的文字，小篆是由春秋戰國的秦文字逐漸演變而成，不是由籀文『省改』而成的」[12]。這裡所說的秦文字，也就是秦代的通用文字，即班固所稱的「秦篆」，後人所說的「秦隸」，也就是我們現在所看到的秦簡牘文字。

「或頗省改」的對象既然不可能的籀文，那裘先生所說的「小篆是由春秋戰國的秦文字逐漸演變而成」這句話或許給我們有些啟示。小篆既然是從春秋戰國的秦文字演變而來，那秦文字在使用過程中，特別是將秦文字編撰識字課本的時候，自然會對小篆字形有所「省改」變化。因此，我們或許可以將小篆作為「或頗省改」的對象去理解，這樣，或許就應該將「或頗省改」後面的逗號去掉，將此句讀成「或頗省改所謂小篆者也」。許慎在這裡所說的「所謂小篆者也」，並不是對《蒼頡篇》、《爰歷篇》、《博學篇》所用文字的界定，而是指許慎的時代所認知的「所謂小篆」。

如果以上解釋並不離譜的話，那許慎這段話所表述的意思應該大致如下：秦始皇兼併天下之初，丞相李斯奏請書同文字，廢棄與秦文字不合的六國文字。為了書同文字，李斯編撰了《蒼頡篇》，中車府令趙高編撰了《爰曆篇》，太史令胡毋敬編撰了《博學篇》，這三篇的文字都取自史籀篇的大篆文字，或是「省改」所謂小篆文字而成。

這樣解讀，可以破解千百年來人們糾纏不清的小篆與秦文的關係，因為李斯所作的《蒼頡篇》就是用「秦文」所編撰，這種文字本身就是我們現在所看到的所謂「秦篆」或「秦隸」，這種字體與漢初的古隸本來就是異名同實的同一種書體。按照這樣理解，那我們現在所看到的漢簡《蒼頡篇》都是隸書字體也就一點也不奇怪了。特別是西漢初期阜陽漢簡《蒼頡篇》，不僅其內容是最接近李斯所撰的秦本，而且其古隸字體也應該是最接近秦文字的一個抄本，而西漢初期以下多達十餘種的漢簡抄本《蒼頡篇》，儘管多為殘篇斷簡，但其始終如一的隸書文字多少也能證明，李斯所奏請的書同文，所用來「罷其不與秦文合者」的文字範本《蒼頡篇》所使用的文字就是「秦文」，也就是我們現在所看到的秦簡牘文字，即當時的通用文字——秦隸。

[12] 裘錫圭：《文字學概要》(商務印書館，1988 年版)，頁 64-65。

附錄



圖一



圖二

國立彰化師範大學文學院學報
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環境改變與生態惡化：

十九世紀英美旅行者筆下的福爾摩沙

盧莉茹[*]

摘要

對多數十九世紀的西方人來說，福爾摩沙是一片神秘而詭譎的未知領土（*terra incognita*）。1860 年，清廷因天津條約被迫開港通商，於是大批歐美旅者——包含探險家、自然科學家、傳教士、外交官、攝影家、海外商人等——紛紛造訪福爾摩沙。在此時空下，英國生物學家克林伍德（Cuthbert Collingwood, 1826-1908）、英國駐打狗領事斯溫侯（Robert Swinhoe, 1836-1877）、美國自然史學家蒂瑞（Joseph Beal Steere, 1842-1940）等人先後造訪打狗、基隆、淡水等地，並詳細記錄與描述各地的地理風貌或水陸動物、鳥類、植物以及自然資源（如高山林木和礦產）。在描述福爾摩沙地貌環境的同時，部份西方旅行者亦在其自然環境踏查紀行中先知先覺地記錄了人類開採大地資源時所造成的環境改變或生態惡化（ecological degradation），這些文本遂成為書寫台灣環境破壞之生態文學作品先驅。近年來有關台灣自然環境的電影作品或生態文學在東亞生態批評（East Asian ecocriticism）領域漸受注意，然而十九世紀英美旅行者書寫福爾摩沙自然環境的文本仍未受到關注與青睞，絕大多數生態批評學者忽略了這些文本的存在。此文填補十九世紀英美自然書寫的拼圖缺塊，將一群鮮為人知的、被排除在主流文學典律之外的早期英美旅行作家的文本納入自然（環境）書寫的研究領域中。此文聚焦於陶德（John Dodd, 1838-1907）、克林伍德、斯溫侯、戴維森（James Wheeler Davidson, 1872-1933）、和瓊恩（George Jones, 1800-1870）筆下的環境改變與生態惡化——特別是山林採伐、空氣污染、物種數量減少之議題，探究這些作家如何書寫十九世紀後半期福爾摩沙的地貌與地景環境之改變，進而先知先覺地表露初期環境意識和生態感知。藉此探討，此文欲指出十九世紀英美旅行者描述並記錄福爾摩沙的自然史書寫實乃醞釀後代環境保護觀念和生態意識的重要文本。

關鍵詞：環境改變與生態惡化、旅行自然史、環境史、生態感知、十九世紀造訪福爾摩沙的英美旅行者

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Environmental Changes and Ecodegradation: The Delineations of Nineteenth-Century Formosa in the Writings of Nineteenth-Century English and American Travelers

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Abstract

For most mid-nineteenth-century Europeans and Americans, Formosa was little-known. To explore this *terra incognita*, plenty of Westerners (including diplomats, imperialist business adventurers, natural history scientists, proselytizing missionaries, and legitimate traders) visited Formosa after the opening of Takau Port and Tamsui Port for trade in 1860. These travelers delineated Formosa's flora and fauna and recorded the island's unknown landscapes and natural resources, including coal, sulphur, petroleum, gold, camphor, and so forth. Mostly written in the form of travel journals, the works of these Western travelers were also pioneering nature writings that documented Formosa's ecological degradation and environmental changes in the nineteenth century. This paper focuses on the representations of environmental damages and ecodegradation in the traveling natural histories of Cuthbert Collingwood (1826-1908), Robert Swinhoe (1836-1877), John Dodd (1838-1907), James Wheeler Davidson (1872-1933), and George Jones (1800-1870). Specific questions that arise in this paper include: How might the genre of natural history relate to non-fictional travel narratives and environmental history? How did Collingwood, Swinhoe, Davidson, Dodd, and Jones offered an accurate transcript of the massive destruction of nature (particularly the devastation of marine species and camphor-trees)? In their traveling natural histories, how did these foreign travelers express their environmental awareness, environmentalist tone, or ecological sensibility?

Keywords: environmental changes and ecodegradation, traveling natural histories, environmental history, ecological sensibility, nineteenth-century English and American travelers who visited Formosa

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在十九世紀，福爾摩沙（Formosa）對多數西方人而言是一片神秘而詭譎的未知領土（*terra incognita*）。1860 年，清廷因天津條約而開放淡水和安平兩港為通商口岸，後來又在英國的抗議與爭取下於 1863 年多開放了打狗（即今高雄）和雞籠（今基隆）兩個港口，准許外國人踏上福爾摩沙這片土地（Carrington 129），於是大批歐美旅者——包含探險家、自然科學家、傳教士、外交官、攝影家、海外商人等——紛紛造訪福爾摩沙。在此時空下，英國生物學家克林伍德（Cuthbert Collingwood, 1826-1908）、英國駐打狗領事斯溫侯（Robert Swinhoe, 1836-1877）、英國茶商陶德（John Dodd, 1838-1907）、美國自然史學家蒂瑞（Joseph Beal Steere, 1842-1940）、美國領事李仙得（Charles W. Le Gendre, 1830-1899）和戴維森（James Wheeler Davidson, 1872-1933）、美國海軍探險者瓊恩（George Jones, 1800-1870）等人先後造訪打狗、基隆、淡水等地，並詳細記錄與描述各地的地理風貌或水陸動物、鳥類、植物以及自然資源（如高山林木和礦產）。這些西方旅行者的自然紀行或旅行日記是目前研究十九世紀福爾摩沙的環境史（environmental history）以及自然史（natural history）的珍貴文史資料。在描述福爾摩沙地貌環境的同時，部份西方旅行者的作品亦先知先覺地記錄了人類開採大地資源時所造成的環境改變或生態破壞，呈現了一百幾十年前台灣的自然生態環境實況，這些文本遂成為書寫台灣環境惡化（environmental degradation）之生態文學作品先驅。在《生態歧義：東亞文學與生態危機》（*Ecoambiguity: East Asian Literatures and Environmental Crises*），東亞生態批評（East Asian ecocriticism）「重量級」學者頌柏（Karen Laura Thornber）認為書寫台灣之生態破壞及環境惡化的作品始於 1980 年代（90），[1]然而本文主張不同論點——早在十九世紀造訪福爾摩沙的英美旅行者已開始記錄台灣的自然環境改變或環境破壞（environmental damages）。近年來有關台灣自然環境的電影作品或生態文學（例如吳明益的自然書寫）在東亞生態批評領域漸受注意，然而十九世紀英美旅行者書寫福爾摩沙自然環境的文本仍未受到關注與青睞，絕大多數生態批評學者忽略了這些文本的存在。[2]誠如當代自然作家劉克襄在《台灣鳥類研究開拓史》的〈前言〉裡所述，台灣的自然生態學史——亦即自然史及環境史——自日據時代以來如同「一塊渺無人跡的荒漠」，除了極「少數學者做過整理彙編的工作外，

[1] 頌柏在「環境危機與東亞文學：不確定的現在與未來」（“Environmental Crises and East Asian Literature: Uncertain Present and Future”）亦強調在東亞文學這塊領域裡，韓國和日本是在 1960 年代後才出現書寫環境破壞的文本，而台灣則是在 1980 年代後才出現書寫或提及福爾摩沙生態破壞或環境惡化之作品（200），但其實早在十九世紀這類作品已經存在。

[2] 以環境文學專書為例，以下三筆近年內出版的有關環境文學的學術書籍皆未處理到十九世紀曾造訪福爾摩沙或亞洲其他島嶼的英美旅行者之自然史文本：(1) Petersheim, Steven, and Madison P. Jones IV, editors. *Writing the Environment in Nineteenth-Century American Literature: The Ecological Awareness of Early Scribes of Nature*，出版年為 2015。(2) Mazzeno, Laurence W, and Ronald D. Morrison, editors. *Victorian Writers and the Environment: Ecocritical Perspective*，於 2017 年出版。 (3) Hall, Dewey W. *Romantic Naturalists, Early Environmentalists: An Ecocritical Study*, *1789-1912*，出版年為 2014。第一筆資料是近年內探究十九世紀美國自然（環境）作家之學術專書，第二筆資料以生態批評視角處理到英國維多利亞時期作家與環境兩者間的關係，第三筆資料處理了十八世紀末到二十世紀初的美國與英國的自然史作家。簡言之，前述三筆近年內出版的自然（環境）書寫專書皆忽略了十九世紀美國旅行者（如戴維森、李仙得、史帝瑞、瓊恩等人）和英國維多利亞時期的旅行者（如斯溫侯、克林伍德、陶德等人）為福爾摩沙這片歐美大陸以外的海外島嶼所書寫的自然史作品。

一直乏人問津」(xv)。即使近數十年來全球(包括台灣)的生態保護意識高漲，然而十九世紀西方旅行者為福爾摩沙所記錄的豐富史料仍未受到關注。現今，這些作品大多乏人問津。此文填補十九世紀英美自然書寫的拼圖缺塊，將一群鮮為人知的、被排除在主流文學典律之外的英美旅行作家的文本納入自然(環境)書寫的研究領域中。本文聚焦於陶德、斯溫侯、克林伍德、戴維森、和瓊恩筆下的環境改變與生態惡化(ecodegradation)——特別是山林採伐(deforestation)、空氣污染、物種數量減少之議題，探究這些作家如何書寫十九世紀後期福爾摩沙的環境地貌改變與生態惡化，進而先知先覺表露了初期環境意識和生態感知(ecological sensibility)。藉此探討，此文欲指出十九世紀英美旅者描述並記錄福爾摩沙大地環境的旅行自然史實乃醞釀後代環境保護觀念和生態意識的重要文本。

一、有關福爾摩沙之環境改變或生態惡化的早期歷史、文化軌跡

人們定居於福爾摩沙島及其鄰近島嶼的歲月至少有八千年；在十七世紀以前，福爾摩沙島鮮為人知且居民不多，因此原始自然生態體系並未遭到破壞，這也是為何葡萄牙水手在 1544 年登陸福爾摩沙時被島上的蒼翠美景與豐饒自然所深深吸引，並將台灣命名為 *Ilha Formosa*，意指美麗的島嶼(Thornber, *Ecoambiguity* 84；李加展 56)。從十七世紀開始，歐洲強權國家如葡萄牙、荷蘭、西班牙等開始遠征世界的「蠻荒」之地，包括福爾摩沙。十七世紀到十九世紀台灣開埠(1860 年前後)這段時空是台灣與西方國家的初次接觸。此期間的旅行探險者主要來自荷蘭與西班牙。1624 年到 1662 年，荷蘭人占領台灣。至於北台灣則歷經西班牙人為期十六年的統治(從 1626 年到 1642 年)。1642 年，荷蘭人攻陷雞籠，結束西班牙人在北台灣的統治。整體而言，荷蘭人及西班牙人以貿易、商業模式管治台灣。1620 年代中期，荷蘭東印度公司(The Dutch East India Company)鼓勵漢人從中國大陸移居福爾摩沙並種植穀物、開墾土地，但大致來說在荷蘭人的統治期間福爾摩沙的物種和土地還是算完整且未遭受破壞(Thornber, *Ecoambiguity* 84)。另外，荷蘭人和西班牙人在其統治台灣島的短暫期間有留下一些文字作品，例如西班牙神父所書寫的福爾摩沙報告以及由荷蘭人和少數英國人所書寫的航海與旅行文學作品——如雷爾森(Cornelis Ryerson，荷蘭人，出生年不詳，卒於 1625)的航海日誌及英國航海家班尼(James Burney，生卒年不詳)的旅行文本(李加展 68-75, 88-93)。[3]1662 年，荷蘭人被鄭成功驅逐，從此福爾摩沙進入「明鄭、清領再殖民時期」。[4]在此時期，鄭成功鼓勵人們開拓更多農地並發展蔗糖產業(sugar industry)。到了清領時期，清廷鼓勵更多漢人從中國大陸移居台灣並取得耕種土地(land acquisition)，開採、利用自然資源(如種植茶樹和樟木)，並繼續從事蔗糖生產。由於鄭成功實施軍事管制又加上「清廷對付鄭氏的禁海政策，因此形成一種

[3] 班尼的旅行文本名為 *Burney's Voyages*。更多有關荷蘭、西班牙殖民時期的航海文學及旅行文學作品的細節請見李加展的《十七、十八世紀歐洲文獻檔案之福爾摩沙文學考》第三章。

[4] 「荷蘭、西班牙殖民時期」及「明鄭、清領再殖民時期」這兩個詞彙乃出自李加展的《十七、十八世紀歐洲文獻檔案之福爾摩沙文學考》一書第三章的標題(56)。

封閉的狀況」（吳明益 173, 174），直到 1858 年英國的軍艦「不屈號」（“Inflexible”）悄悄抵達台灣安平港尋找兩名失蹤的外國人，此封閉、「鎖國」狀況才結束（劉克襄《探險家在台灣》5）。「不屈號」除了載滿武裝的英國海軍外還有幾位自然史學者——包括斯溫侯，自此開啟了歐美旅行者、自然史學家航向福爾摩沙探險的黃金時期。

從 1860 年臺灣開埠前後到 1895 年日據時代開始前的這段時空是西方旅者在福爾摩沙從事自然探查與活動的黃金歲月。大批外國人士於此期間抵台做廣泛的自然蒐集（包括動植物、鳥類採集和分類）與自然探查，這些西方旅行者的身分大致有三大類。第一種類型的外國旅行者是傳教士，包括馬偕（Leslie Mackay, 1844-1901）、李庥（Rev. Hugh Ritchie, 1835-1879）、馬雅各（Dr. James Maxwell, 1836-1921）、甘為霖（William Campbell, 1841-1921）等。他們遠從英國或加拿大來到台灣，在全島各地跋山涉水開展傳教及醫療工作，並記錄自己旅途中的觀察與見聞。馬偕的《臺灣遙寄》（*Far from Formosa*, 1895）和甘為霖的《福爾摩沙素描》（*Sketches From Formosa*, 1915）皆是典型例子。這些著作是傳教史，同時亦是有關早期台灣的旅行自然史，它們為世界得以認識台灣做出貢獻。第二種類型的十九世紀西洋旅行者則是官方人員（包括領事、海關職員、燈塔看守員）以及商務人士，包括艾倫（Herbert J. Allen，生卒年不詳）、斯溫侯、必麒麟（William Alexander Pickering, 1840-1907）、戴維森、李仙得、陶德等人。艾倫曾任英國領事，他和李庥、馬偕曾於 1875 年在福爾摩沙內陸旅行並撰寫〈從淡水到台灣府的穿越福爾摩沙之旅〉（“Notes of a Journey through Formosa from Tamsui to Taiwanfu”）（Oteness 3）。斯溫侯於 1860 年擔任駐台副領事，並於 1864 年擔任英國駐打狗的第一任領事。必麒麟則曾任中國海關檢查員、英國洋行職員及通譯等工作。他將在台灣的經歷寫成《歷險福爾摩沙》（*Pioneering in Formosa: Recollections of Adventures among Mandarins, Wreckers, and Head-Hunters*, 1898）一書。另一位外國旅者李仙得擔任過美國駐廈門領事，他撰寫了《台灣紀行》（*Notes of Travel in Formosa*）。而戴維森則曾任美國駐台領事；1903 年，戴維森的《福爾摩沙島：過去與現在》（*The Island of Formosa: Past and Present*）問世，此書是第一本有關台灣的英文專書。至於陶德則是長期住在福爾摩沙北部的茶商（費德廉、羅效德 226）；對自然史深感興趣的陶德曾發表〈福爾摩沙〉（“Formosa”）於《蘇格蘭地理雜誌》（*The Scottish Geographic Magazine*），此文呈現台灣豐富的大地物產與自然資源。第三種類型的西方旅行者是前來福爾摩沙進行自然採集與科學研究的自然史學家，如斯溫侯、克林伍德、克萊因瓦奇特（George Kleinwächter，生卒年不詳）、史蒂瑞等人。斯溫侯除了英國領事的身分外亦是偉大的生物學家及自然史學家。為了進行自然科學探究，他大量採集台灣的鳥類和動植物標本，並深入描述這些物種，發表於《倫敦皇家地理學會學報》（*Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London*）等刊物。[5]另一位自然史學家克林伍德亦來自英國，他著有《一位自然史學家在中國海域及沿岸的漫遊》（*Rambles of a Naturalist on the Shores and Waters of the China Sea*）；此書記錄了克林伍德的基隆

[5] 本文在「Works Cited」中有列出斯溫侯的著作資料。

河之旅。[6]克萊因瓦奇特則是德國籍地質學家，他的〈福爾摩沙地質研究〉（“Researches into the Geology of Formosa”）發表於《英國亞洲學會中國北部分會期刊》（*Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*）。而史帝瑞則是美國自然史教授，其書稿包括《福爾摩沙及其住民》（*Formosa and Its Inhabitants*）和〈來自福爾摩沙的書信〉（“Letters from Formosa”）等。除了前述三種類型的西方旅行人士外，尚有一些較難被分類的歐美旅者，例如湯姆生（John Thomson, 1837-1921）和瓊恩。湯姆生是英國攝影家，但亦發表多篇自然史報導於《皇家地理學會學報》。瓊恩則是美國軍艦的軍船牧師兼遠征記事者（chronicler）兼業餘自然史學家。[7]瓊恩是搭乘由培瑞準將（Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794-1858）率領的美國遠征軍艦（此船主要梭巡中國海與日本）來台勘媒、採集煤炭樣本並撰寫旅行踏查日記。瓊恩的旅行日記名為〈造訪福爾摩沙島的煤礦地域〉（“A Visit to the Coal Regions of the Island of Formosa”）。大體而言，自 1860 年清廷開港通商到 1895 年日本開始殖民台灣的期間，滿清當局雖有意降低對原住民土地和對原始自然生態的破壞，但仍然無法抵擋十九世紀後半期福爾摩沙島上的快速農業擴張（rapid agricultural expansion）這個大環境（Thornber, *Ecoambiguity* 85）。

到了日本殖民時期（從 1896 年到 1949 年），人類與自然生態系統兩者間的互動（human interactions with ecosystem）出現重大轉變。日本政府大舉採伐山林（deforestation），特別是樟木。日本政府強硬規定所有的福爾摩沙林地皆不得私有，此舉意味著台灣的珍貴林木資源完全被日本殖民政府接管；但儘管如此在日據時期山林採伐並未造成嚴重的環境破壞，真正造成福爾摩沙生態惡化的元兇其實是蔗糖產業，日本帝國為了擴展台灣的經濟出口於是積極開拓土地，種植甘蔗（Thornber, *Ecoambiguity* 85）。此外，日本人在 1934 年為了水力發電而在日月潭興建水庫，此舉開啟了工業化對於福爾摩沙所造成的重大環境改變和生態破壞（Thornber, *Ecoambiguity* 85）。在自然旅行者方面，日據時代是日本探險家的時代。日據初期，日籍人類學家鳥居龍藏及森邊之助分別進入被稱為「黑暗世界」的台灣中央山脈探訪調查，留下珍貴自然史料（劉克襄，《探險家在台灣》5）。日據時期的探險家集中於人類學、動物學、植物學及昆蟲學的專業、深度研究與調查。伊能嘉矩是「首位將臺灣原住民分為八族的人類學者」（吳明益 178）。在動物學方面，鹿野忠雄可能是繼斯溫侯之後最重要的外國探險家及自然史學者，他記錄各種臺灣哺乳類動物及鳥類，亦撰寫動物地理學與植物學等科學報告（劉克襄，《探險家在台灣》8）。在昆蟲學方面，江崎悌三與松村松年兩人皆深研台灣蝶類，為數十種蝶類命名（吳明益 180）。以上是十九世紀後半期以前和日治時期有關福爾摩沙之環境改變或環境破壞的歷史與文化軌跡，亦是外國旅行者或自然探險家在福爾摩沙活動的大致脈絡。

[6] 在「Works Cited」裡，本文羅列出克林伍德的著作資料。

[7] 瓊恩的旅行踏查報告被收錄於《美國軍艦前往中國海和日本的遠征敘述》（*Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States*）。

二、旅行自然史、環境史、與有關十九世紀福爾摩沙之生態惡化議題的連結

十九世紀西方旅行者的福爾摩沙探查紀行——如陶德的〈福爾摩沙〉、克林伍德的《一位自然史學家在中國海域及沿岸的漫遊》、斯溫侯的〈福爾摩沙島記事〉（“Notes on the Island of Formosa”）、戴維森的《福爾摩沙島》、瓊恩的〈造訪福爾摩沙島的煤礦地域〉等——為福爾摩沙的原始大地和自然物種做第一手發現、觀察、描述與記錄，這些旅行文本亦傳達有關福爾摩沙這片陌生地之自然物產的科學知識和訊息。在本質上，歐陸作家的旅行文本乃旅行者記述（travelers’ accounts）和自然史的結合。自然史是一門盛行於十八、十九世紀歐美兩地的科學；它是「一種有關自然景物、地理風貌」、或「動植物之特徵所做的描述的事實聚集」（the aggregate of facts）（Regis 5）。在十八、十九世紀，自然史涵蓋了現今多門學科與知識，如植物學、鳥類學、動物學、地質學等（Smallwood 3）。而自然史書寫則是一種透過語言及修辭去描述自然史科學的文本，因此它是融合科學及文學的特殊文類。自然史書寫一方面呈現有關自然的科學，另一方面亦展現有關自然的文學。十九世紀西方旅行者的在福爾摩沙的自然生態探險紀行大多以旅行日記做為主要創作形式。就字源來說，自然史書寫和旅行敘述有密切關係。自然史這個詞彙裡的「史」（“history”）這個字可追溯到古希臘時期亞里斯多德（Aristotle）對於此字所詮釋的雙重意義。亞里斯多德認為，「歷史」這個字一方面意味著「探究」（“an inquiry”）或「對於事物之探究所做的陳述」（“an account of one’s inquiry”）（Bergon 130）。由此推之，「自然史」這個詞彙可被解釋為——「對於大自然的探究」或是「對於自然界萬物的觀察所做的系統性陳述」。另一方面，「歷史」一詞也同時意味著「敘述」（“a narrative”）（Bergon 130）。在臺灣開埠前後，歐美探險家們——如克林伍德等人——藉由跨海旅行去探查台灣的自然地貌環境，因此其書寫結合了他們對大自然的科學探究以及他們針對自己的旅行所做之敘述。如此一來「自然史」（或旅行「自然史」）這個詞彙便可被解釋為——針對個人在旅行中對大自然的親身觀察所做的敘述。

本質上，環境史旨在表達有關大自然——亦即植物和動物（包括人類）等物種的生活世界——的生態事實和歷史事實（ecological and historical facts）；環境史記錄環境改變或生態破壞，而環境改變與人類行為兩者間是緊密扣連的——人類影響環境同時也被環境影響（Barca 132-33）。[8]環境史理論家葛洛夫（Richard H. Grove）指出，人們所使用的「環境史」一詞乃指有關於人類與物種的關係以及物種與周遭環境的關係（261）。生態批評兼環境史學者伍斯特（Donald Worster）認為環境史的研究目的在於

[8] 環境史的定義和研究的目的其實與「人類世」（Anthropocene）概念互相扣連。自二十世紀末、二十一世紀初以降，「人類世」議題廣被討論，它指的是「人類的時代」（the Age of Man）。「人類世」這個詞彙主要強調人類是足以去影響或改變整個生態系統的（Arias-Maldonado 73）。

加深我們了解「人類在歲月的進展中是如何受自然環境的影響以及人類如何影響自然環境和得到了什麼結果」(290-291)。十九世紀中後期，福爾摩沙豐富的大地物產和天然資源例如林木及礦產使得台灣成為歐美列強（包括美國、英國、法國）和日本眼中的「待宰肥羊」與「國際戰利品」(“international prize”) （Gordon vi)，台灣島成為兵家必爭之地，同時亦吸引大批歐美旅者跨海來台查探或開採大地資源。事實上，帝國主義這個龐大「事業」(imperial enterprise）的核心要素之一即是榨取殖民地或弱小國家的土地資源和物產（resource extraction)，以功利主義和剝削利用的價值判斷（utilitarian and exploitative valuation）來看待自然生態環境，大自然遂成為商業貿易資源，同時亦被商品化（Grove 2)。十九世紀歐美列強在海外的帝國主義擴張影響了人類和土地的關係，人們開採、榨取大地資源造成了環境惡化與生態破壞。清領後期，西方旅者的自然史旅行書寫開始記錄人類在福爾摩沙破壞自然生態所造成的環境改變（human-induced environmental change)，呈現一百幾十年前台灣的環境史，同時亦表露西方旅行者敏銳的生態感知與初期環境意識。[9]因此，福爾摩沙這個「新世界」不只是一片充滿新奇物種的科學研究佳地或充滿自然資源的豐饒寶地，同時亦成為探索人類與自然世界兩者間之關係的一個場域。此場域可供人類去思索自己在大自然中的位置，同時亦提供一種人類與土地之間較為深思熟慮的關係。簡言之，十九世紀西方旅行者除了引介有關福爾摩沙之自然資源、地理特色等科學知識外還開啟了一種人與自然相處模式的再界定，進而醞釀了後世後代的環境保護意識。

三、十九世紀英美旅行者筆下有關福爾摩沙之環境改變與生態惡化

十九世紀後半期來台之英美旅者的自然史旅行書寫（如陶德的〈福爾摩沙〉、瓊恩的〈造訪福爾摩沙島的煤礦地域〉等作品）除了傳達福爾摩沙境內自然物產、土地資源、及本土物種的科學知識給讀者外同時亦再現人類開採自然資源時所造成的環境改變或生態惡化——特別是山林採伐、空氣污染、及物種數量減少之議題。在此小節，本文將探討十九世紀英美旅行者（陶德、戴維森、斯溫侯、克林伍德、瓊恩等）筆鋒下有關福爾摩沙之的生態改變與環境惡化議題。

(一)山林採伐

很難想像，早在十九世紀後半期英美旅行者（特別是戴維森和陶德）已經在其自然史書寫中表達對於森林砍伐（deforestation）議題的關切。舉例而言，在《福爾摩沙

[9] 生態批評學者克拉克（Timothy Clark）認為此環境意識的出現乃是大自然的反動（nature’s backlash）——亦即一種反對被人類文明所殖民的力量（against the forces of human civilization)(124)。

島：過去與現在》這本書裡戴維森一方面呈現福爾摩沙這個海外島嶼的豐饒天然資源（例如林木與各式各樣植物和礦產等），[10]另一方面他亦提及「殖民者」（“the colonists”）為了商貿利潤而大舉砍伐山林（492）。[11]在〈福爾摩沙的茶葉產業〉（“Chapter XXIII: The Formosan Tea Industry”）這個章節，戴維森提到為了「茶葉貿易的豐碩利潤，殖民者近十年內（1868 to 1878）大舉砍伐山林。……山區的原始高聳林木和森林樹種被大規模砍伐……人們改種茶樹和其他農業性作物」（379）。透過其旅行自然史書寫，戴維森記錄了「殖民者」的功利主義以及他們剝削利用土地資源時所造成的環境惡化與生態改變，呈現一百幾十年前台灣的環境史，同時亦表露他的初期環境感知與環境關懷。

除了戴維森外，陶德的旅行自然史亦再現十九世紀中後期台灣的環境破壞與生態惡化。在其旅行文本〈福爾摩沙〉中，陶德除了對台灣北部的豐富大地物產與自然資源做充分、廣泛的自然史描述外，同時亦談到福爾摩沙的森林與樹木（特別是樟木）之開採與造林復育：

> 在淡水北部，樟木是僅次於茶葉貿易的主要出口商品。……若從商業角度來看樟木林，中國政府的行為實在非常愚蠢。據我所知，人們對樟木需求的歲月至少超過三十年，然而清廷卻從未對於樟木的濫伐採取任何預防措施，而且也沒有在大片尚未被開發且無人居住的土地重新造林。雖然我前往內陸山區踏查時發現樟木的數量依然豐富而且在未來數年內應該還不用去擔心供不應求的問題，然而當前人們對樟木的需求量與日俱增的情勢必會加速樟木林被摧毀的速度。（568-69）

在此段自然史引文中，陶德呈現有關十九世紀淡水一帶樟木林被任意採伐與濫墾破壞的環境史，暗示樟樹未來可能會滅絕（extinction），進而流露他敏銳的生態感知和環境關懷。值得一提的是，陶德的這段旅行自然史文字亦高度暗示了因應長久將來樟木數量銳減的兩個解決之道，那就是在尚未被開發的土地重新造林（“ re-afforestation”）以及透過官方行政管理（“administration”）來預防樟木林被胡亂浪費（“to prevent the

[10] 戴維森的《福爾摩沙島》十分著墨於福爾摩沙的豐饒天然資源，如高山林木、煤礦、「石油、天然氣、硫磺泉和食鹽」等（492）。為了強調台灣的經濟發展前景，戴維森在《福爾摩沙島》的主要副標題——「*Past and Present*」——的後面還添加了次要副標題：「歷史、住民、資源和商業前景。茶、樟腦、糖、黃金、煤礦、硫磺、經濟作物和其他產品」（*History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and other Productions*）。透過這個冗長標題，戴維森強調台灣的豐富物產和自然資源可為美國帶來商業利益。

[11] 此引文中戴維森所提到的「殖民者」應指斯溫侯和陶德。1864 年，斯溫侯在〈福爾摩沙島記事〉提到茶葉是福爾摩沙淡水一帶的主要產物，此產物「將可以在澳洲、好望角、新加坡等地找到外銷市場……賣給外國商人」（24）。陶德可能是看到斯溫侯這篇發表於《倫敦皇家地理學會學報》的文章後隨即在台灣北部著手經營茶葉貿易（Carrington 135）。後來他的茶葉生意興隆，成功外銷到美國紐約並廣受好評，因此被稱為「台灣烏龍茶之父」（費德廉、羅效德 226）。

reckless waste of the forest”）與任意破壞，進而阻止山林環境被破壞以及生態惡化。陶德於〈福爾摩沙〉的這段文字醞釀了二十世紀末和二十一世紀初的環境永續思維（sustainability thinking），也使他成為森林保護和環境永續的先驅者。

(二)空氣污染

同樣令人難以想像和置信——早在十九世紀後半期，造訪福爾摩沙的英美旅行者（瓊恩、克林伍德、斯溫侯、和戴維森等人）的自然史書寫已先知先覺呈現空氣污染的議題。這些西方旅行者主要是在描述基隆豐富的煤礦資源時同時察覺到煤在燃燒時所造成的嚴重空氣污染問題。[12]舉例而言，在〈造訪福爾摩沙島的煤礦地域〉，瓊恩提到基隆所盛產的瀝青煤「在燃燒時會釋放出濃煙和十分惡臭的空氣」（“a thick smoke and very offensive smell”）（163）。在《一位自然史學家在中國海域及沿岸的漫遊》中，克林伍德告訴讀者基隆的煤「都燃盡得很快而且會產生許多煙霧和非常熾熱的熱氣……煙霧也很髒」（95）。另外，在〈福爾摩沙島記事〉這篇旅行自然史作品中，斯溫侯亦提到福爾摩沙的煤「在燃燒時會產生一種令人不愉快的惡臭空氣，此臭氣聞起來像是含硫的惡臭」（“sulphurous stench”）（13）。換言之，瓊恩、克林伍德、和斯溫侯已開始意識到煤和空氣汙染兩者間的緊密關係。雖然十九世紀的英美旅者尚未有煤乃生態系統之一份子（coal as a part of ecological system）的概念而且他們也尚未察覺到煤的燃燒會造成全球暖化與氣候變遷，但至少他們已經發現燒煤會汙染空氣，破壞空氣品質。

除了書寫燒煤所造成的惡臭空氣外，西方旅行者亦察覺到煤礦區所造成的空氣污染。以下描述基隆煤礦周邊地域的惡臭空氣之引文即是一例，此引文出自「福爾摩沙」（“Formosa”），[13]作者是一位匿名的十九世紀旅行者：

> 此煤炭礦區位於歐洲旅行者通稱為「煤港」（“Coal Harbor”，今基隆港）的一個灣區。工人用一般中國式的方法採礦，開採出含瀝青的黑煤。……整個採礦區域瀰漫著惡臭空氣，據說此臭氣對昆蟲來說是致命的。（324）

此段旅行自然史引文呈現人類開採煤礦資源時所導致的空氣污染和惡臭空氣，強調礦區臭氣的危險性和殺傷力以及此臭氣對所有生物（特別是昆蟲）的致命性，藉此強調清領時期基隆礦區的環境改變和生態惡化，同時詳實呈現了十九世紀的福爾摩沙

[12] 在十九世紀，帝國勢力快速擴張，歐美等強權國家派遣海軍搭汽船（steamship）在世界各地探尋物產和自然資源，特別是煤礦。1847 年，英國歌爾頓上尉（Lieut D. M. Gordon，1818-1848）搭乘「皇家號」（“Royalist”）探訪基隆並發現大量煤礦，1849 年，搭乘「海豚號」（“Dolphin”）的美國海軍歐格登軍官（Commander Odgen）也被派至台灣勘煤，因為美國想取得跨太平洋的汽船航運路線（trans-Pacific steam navigation）與貿易主導權，而且煤乃是汽船的主燃料（Carrington 56-58）。

[13] 以下是此文詳細資料：“Formosa”, *The Treaty Ports of China and Japan*, edited by N. B. Dannys (London:Trubner,1867),323-24, https://rdc.reed.edu/c/formosa/s/r?_pp=20&s=fbc2565d09aff6603f2e8d81298db27559c16c88&p=13&pp=1.

環境史。

另一位十九世紀後期作家戴維森在《福爾摩沙島》這部旅行自然史著作中亦提及基隆礦區所散發的致命熱氣和惡劣空氣品質：

> 這個島有取之不盡、用之不竭的煤礦。……雖然採煤場的機具設備充足而且採煤專家亦可勝任，但是煤礦工人短缺是在這裡〔基隆〕成功採礦的最大障礙。煤礦區以及鄰近地域可能是福爾摩沙最不健康的地方。礦區周邊遍佈著茂密叢林且常下大雨，雨後整個區域常充滿蒸發的熱氣，空氣中瀰漫著蒸氣煙霧，最後導致大量來自中國大陸的礦工發燒，最後身體不支病倒。(482)

在此段引文中戴維森一方面強調福爾摩沙的豐饒且「取之不盡」的煤礦資源，另一方面他亦察覺到基隆礦區及周邊地域的熾熱空氣和「蒸氣煙霧」對於人體是「不健康的」，而且還會導致煤礦工人生病死亡。事實上，在所有化石燃料中，煤在燃燒後是最髒且會釋出最多二氧化碳的燃料，然而早在十九世紀末、二十世紀初，戴維森的《福爾摩沙》這部自然史作品已經記述了空氣汙染、人體健康、和煤（燒煤或煤礦區域本身）三者間的密切關係。

(三)物種數量減少

除了呈現有關十九世紀福爾摩沙島上的山林採伐和空氣污染議題外，部分西方旅者——特別是克林伍德——的旅行自然史還再現另一個生態惡化狀況——生物物種數量的減少。在《一位自然史學家在中國海域及沿岸的漫遊》這部旅行自然史作品中，[14] 克林伍德細膩描述基隆港和打狗港海域豐富而多樣的珍奇海洋生物，如水母（Acalephs or sea-jellies）、跳魚（leaping fish）、海葵（Anemone）、海兔（sea-hare）、珊瑚魚（coral-fish）、海膽（Echini）、海蛞蝓（Doris）、水螅（Hydrozoa）、雀鯛（Pomacentrus）、角駝蝶螺（Creseis）等，但他亦同時記述這些海洋物種被福爾摩沙漁民的牽引網（towing-net）大量捕獲的情形，藉此暗示大海物種數量減少之趨勢：

> 駐足在此港口〔基隆港〕一陣子便可發現漁民的牽引網捕獲……透明海螺（pteropods）……和大量而令人醒目的角駝蝶螺等生物。這些小生物非常大群地游到此處然後被牽引網一次又一次地大量捕捉，因此漁民須花費不少工夫來去掉這些生物脆弱的外殼。(98-99)

此引文刻劃十九世紀福爾摩沙海洋物種（特別是遠洋海螺類生物）被大量摧毀的

[14] 此書第一章到第八章聚焦於福爾摩沙島（包括打狗港、淡水、基隆、蘇澳等地）、澎湖群島以及台灣東北的小島嶼，例如花瓶嶼（Pinnacle Island）、棉花嶼（Craig Island）、彭佳嶼（Agincourt Island）等。

環境史，呈現克林伍德對於大海生物被漁民大量捕殺的一種初期環境認知（an incipient awareness of the massive destruction of marine species）。在《一位自然史學家在中國海域及沿岸的漫遊》第六章後半部，克林伍德接著敘述被漁夫補捉上岸的美麗透明水母和大量的各式各樣海螺等生物是如何被放置在裝滿海水的容器中，然後經過連日大雨後（以及人類用手碰觸這些生物後）一一死亡的過程；此章節以克林伍德感嘆海洋生物的脆弱和死亡作為結尾：

> 眾所周知，大雨本身所帶來的新鮮雨水對於脆弱的海洋生物是非常具摧毀性的。然而這些原本數量豐富的海洋生物到底是從哪裡來的？如果海洋表面是他們的自然棲息地的話，為什麼它們愈來愈少出現在海面上呢？（100）

透過修辭性問句的收尾，克林伍德感嘆福爾摩沙海洋生物的逐漸消失，流露其敏銳生態感知——他已察覺到海洋表面動物（如水母、角駝蝶螺等）在早期漁民大量捕殺下數量的銳減。此段自然史文字呈現十九世紀福爾摩沙海洋生物棲息地的環境改變與生態惡化，同時亦顯示克林伍德的環境關懷意識。

四、結語

十九世紀中後期，來自英國和美國的官員、商人、自然科學家、軍艦成員等人士不約而同來到福爾摩沙這座位於亞熱帶的美麗島嶼，展開令其嘆為觀止且大開眼界的自然生態之旅，他們以旅行日記等方式留下了自然史作品給後世。在一百幾十年前，台灣還是綠林遍佈、充滿新奇物種以及各式各樣自然物產資源的壯麗生態世界。這點點滴滴都被克林伍德、陶德、斯溫侯、瓊恩等西方旅行者以文字記錄下來。在描述福爾摩沙豐富自然資源的同時，這些旅行者亦詳實記述了人類開採大地資源時所造成的環境改變或生態惡化——特別是山林採伐、空氣污染、和物種數量減少，進而表露他們敏銳的生態感知和環境關懷意識。這些一百幾十年前的福爾摩沙見聞錄一方面是生態批評和自然書寫研究廣被忽略的文學地景，另一方面亦是台灣自然史與環境史相當珍貴的一頁。[15] 環境史學者摩爾（R. I. Moore）曾指出：「要對過去產生新透視，幾乎沒有比環境史更好的例子。它與當代迫切的憂慮有關是很清楚的，但它也刺激了世界上很多地方、很多時期，甚至是遙遠的過去重新評價」（qtd. in 劉翠溶 1）。生活於二十一世紀的我們時常會接觸到環境保護、生態危機、環境惡化等議題，近數十年來台灣的自然書寫與生態文學作品經常處理到這些議題。然而早在十九世紀，前來福爾摩沙旅行的西方人士其實已開始記錄台灣的環境破壞與生態惡化，先知先覺地呈現這些議題的輪廓。我們這群面臨生態危機的現代人如果能去重溯並閱讀十九世紀英美旅者為福爾摩沙所書寫的環境史兼旅行自然史將更會了解這些早期文本的內在價值。

[15] 這些作品亦是當代有關福爾摩沙的自然書寫或生態文學的先驅。

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《中國英雄》於歐洲之初期傳播研究

龔詩堯*

摘要

《中國英雄》(L'eroe cinese)是《趙氏孤兒》在歐洲的改編劇本中，最早付諸演出的一部。由號稱「正歌劇作詞家之王」的義大利文學家梅塔斯塔齊奧(Pietro Metastasio)編寫劇本，在十八世紀風行一時；更經當時多位作曲家譜曲，使一部元朝戲曲，化為二十餘部歐洲歌劇。本文整理其前數部歌劇之首次演出情況，分別為：朱塞佩・博諾(Giuseppe Bonno)於維也納、一位佚名作曲家於威尼斯、達維德・佩雷斯(David Pérez)於里斯本、巴爾達薩里·加露皮(Baldassare Galuppi)於那不勒斯，和約翰・阿道夫・哈塞(Johann Adolph Hasse)於德勒斯登。呈現《中國英雄》的初期創作與傳播情況，分析在此五座城市優先上演之條件，幾位作曲家們建立的示範作用，從而促成十餘位後起之秀的跟進創作。文中嘗試會通中外漢學、國別史、音樂、戲劇等不同領域的研究成果，並藉此反思當前的奧地利、葡萄牙、義大利、德國各地區十八世紀歐洲「中國熱」，乃至於漢學研究的盲點。

關鍵詞：歐洲漢學、十八世紀「中國熱」、義大利歌劇、中西交流

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* 本文修訂過程中，承蒙審查委員提供之寶貴意見，俾使論述能更加完善，並指引後續之研究方向，特此致謝。

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The Initial Dissemination of *L'Eroe Cinese* in Europe

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Abstract

L'eroe cinese is the first performed adaptation of *The Orphan of Zhao* in Europe. Largely popular in the 18th century, the script was written by Italian writer Pietro Metastasio, who is widely considered to be the most important writer of opera seria libretti. Also composed by many other composers at that time, this Yuan Dynasty opera was turned into more than 20 European operas. This paper seeks to address the first performances of the first few operas, which were written by Giuseppe Bonno in Vienna, an anonymous composer in Venice, David Pérez in Lisbon, Baldassare Galuppi is in Naples, and Johann Adolph Hasse is in Dresden. Besides presenting the initial creation and dissemination of *L'eroe cinese*, we will also analyze the conditions for showcase priorities in these five cities, and how the demonstration role of the four composers further led to the follow-up creation of more than ten rising stars. We will try to present research results in different fields such as Sinology, Chinese history, music, and drama. At the same time, we will reflect on the 18th century "Chinoiserie" in Austria, Portugal, Italy, and Germany, which leads up to the blind-spot towards Sinology.

Keyword: Sinology, Chinoiserie in the Eighteenth Century, Italian Opera, cultural exchange

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一、前言

清朝雍正九年（西元 1731 年），元朝雜劇《趙氏孤兒大報讐》（以下簡稱《趙氏孤兒》）經旅居中土的法國天主教耶穌會神父馬若瑟(Joseph Prémare, 1666–1736)之手，[1]而成為第一部被翻譯成歐洲語言的中國戲劇。馬若瑟將之寄回歐洲，而輾轉被杜赫德(Jean Baptiste du Halde, 1674－1743)收入《中國詳誌》，於 1735 年出版，引起了廣泛的重視。[2]

然而，馬若瑟的《趙氏孤兒》譯本只求令歐洲讀者理解中文戲劇概況，所以刪掉了傳統戲曲的精華──唱詞。戲劇的真正生命在於實際演出，而作為一個劇本，馬若瑟譯本的演出功能顯然不令人滿意，[3]所以，歐洲多位劇作家們先後進行了改編。

其中，梅塔斯塔齊奧(Pietro Metastasio, 1698 –1782)的義大利文劇本《中國英雄》(L'eroe cinese)即為諸改編劇本中被搬上舞臺的第一部，[4]之後又激發了二十餘位作曲家的靈感；遂使一部元朝戲曲，化為二十餘部歐洲歌劇。[5]

梅塔斯塔齊奧的《中國英雄》在前人的研究中不時被提及，然而，因其跨領域的特殊質性，所以在漢學、戲劇、音樂等領域中各有偏重，彼此之間卻疏於互通。本文即欲匯整、梳理各研究之成果，更完整勾勒《中國英雄》之傳播詳情，並呈現其文化意義。[6]

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1 馬若瑟之生平，參考：張西平，〈清代來華傳教士馬若瑟研究〉，《清史研究》第 2 期(2009 年 5 月)，頁 40-47。

2 杜赫德《中國通志》與《趙氏孤兒》流傳與改編之概況，參考：范存忠，《中國文化在啟蒙時期的英國》（南京：譯林出版社，2010 年），第四章〈杜赫德的《中國通志》〉，頁 65。閻宗臨，〈杜赫德的著作及其研究〉，收於閻守誠編《傳教士與法國早期漢學》(鄭州：大象出版社，2003 年)，頁 1-101。

3 首部據《趙氏孤兒》譯本改編版，為英國威廉・哈切特（William Hatchett）的《中國孤兒：一個歷史悲劇》（The Chinese Orphan: An Historical Tragedy），當時未曾被搬演。參考：方重，〈十八世紀的英國文學與中國〉，收入李達三、劉介民編《中外比較文學研究：第一冊(上)》（臺北：臺灣學生書局，1992 年），頁 214-215。范存忠，《中國文化在啟蒙時期的英國》，第七章〈中國的戲劇（下）〉一、〈哈切特的改編本《中國孤兒》〉，頁 140-142。

4 梅塔斯塔齊奧，義大利劇作家，原名 Pietro Antonio Domenico Trapassi，生於羅馬，後半生主要在維也納擔任宮廷詩人。被譽為「自塔索(Tasso)以後，義大利首位真正意義上的文學大師」，「正歌劇之王」和「十八世紀第一位戲劇改革者」。參考：張世華，《義大利文學史（第三版）》(上海外語教育出版社，2013 年)，第七章〈阿卡迪亞詩派時期的義大利文學〉第五節〈歌劇作家梅塔斯塔齊奧〉，頁 178-180；Chisholm, Hugh, *Encyclopædia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information (11th ed.)*. (London: Cambridge University Press., 1911), Vol. 17-18, p.256。

5 談及《中國英雄》作曲家群的書籍，多為外文資料，其中列舉其姓(last name)較多位者，有： Ward, Adrienne, *Pagodas in play: China on the eighteenth-century Italian opera stage* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2010), p. 184，Könemann, *Ópera* (Köln: Könemann Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p. 20；中文書籍則有：林青華著，劉紅柱譯，《中樂西漸的歷程(中文版)──對 1800 年以前中國音樂流傳歐洲的歷史探討》（北京：中央音樂學院出版社，2014 年），〈附錄：以中國意念為題材的歌劇、舞劇等作品〉，頁 133-134。筆者比對所見數份研究名單，去其重複與誤植者，共得 21 人；另有部份樂譜之作曲者不詳，可參考：龔詩堯，〈行遍半個歐洲的《中國貴婦》和《中國英雄》──梅塔斯塔齊奧的中國題材劇本之地位與傳播初探〉，收入郭永吉、呂文翠、王學玲編《朱曉海教授六五華誕暨榮退慶祝論文集》（臺北：臺灣學生書局，2015 年），頁 271-294。

6 關於 18 世紀歐洲「中國風」(法文：Chinoiserie)，參考：許明龍，《歐洲 18 世紀"中國熱"》（太原：山西教育出版社，1999 年）。昂納(Hugh Honour)著；劉愛英、秦紅譯，《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》（北京：北京大學出版社，2017 年）。二書分別由中國和歐洲不同視角來分析「中國熱」現象。

本文討論的五部歌劇集中在兩年之內誕生，最能展現《中國英雄》的原初環境和創作需求。其中四位作曲家於今日雖非家喻戶曉，在生前都名重一時，而且與劇本作者梅塔斯塔齊奧均有直接合作關係，《中國英雄》之能廣為後輩再創作，這些前輩作曲家亦功不可沒。

文中考訂五部歌劇首次演出時間，按時序先後排列，以呈現其縱向歷時意義，並橫向展現各劇上演城市之人文環境，闡明中華文化元素戲劇之創作、演出與地域乃至歐洲中國風之關聯。

二、《中國英雄》的首演與維也納宮廷作曲家

《中國英雄》首度演出於 1752 年 5 月 13 日，地點在維也納。於前人研究中時有述及，然詳略不一，而模糊、訛誤之處亦不少。較詳實者，如：張西平、馬西尼《中外文學交流史：中國－義大利卷》〈第八章 18 世紀中義文化的交流．第四節 18 世紀義大利戲劇中的“中國英雄”和“中國公主”〉：

> 在維也納期間，梅塔斯塔西奧應神聖羅馬帝國皇后之邀編寫一個劇本。……由於皇后遵從文藝復興時期義大利的戲曲理論，即古典的“三一律”，要求故事從發生到完成要在一天之中的同一場地，所以梅塔斯塔西奧僅僅擷取了原作中的一小部分情節，設置了 5 位人物。三幕喜劇《中國英雄》於 1752 年完成，並於同年在奧地利皇家劇院首演，皇室成員集體親臨觀看並表示讚賞。深受觀眾歡迎的這部歌劇又於次年在威尼斯重新上演。[7]

此段引文對於劇本的概況和改編情況有較詳實的描述，不過，《中國英雄》既非以一般戲劇而是歌劇方式呈現，那麼作曲者是誰？文中並未指出。另外，皇室成員並非僅集體親臨觀賞，而是親自粉墨登場，參與演唱。可參考〈"中國孤兒"在義大利：梅塔斯塔齊奧筆下的"中國英雄"〉：

> 根據奧地利女王的旨意完成，於 1752 年春天在甚布倫(Schönbrunn)宮劇院首演，與《中國女子》一樣，本次演出的參加者也是一些宮廷貴婦和騎士，全劇配的是博諾(G. Bonno)的音樂。[8]

此處所謂「奧地利女王」與上文的「神聖羅馬帝國皇后」無疑為同一人，即瑪麗亞•特蕾莎•沃爾布加•阿瑪麗亞•克里斯蒂娜(Maria Theresia Walburga Amalia Christina, 1717-1780)，哈布斯堡君主史上唯一女性統治者。[9]其夫婿法蘭茲一世（Franz I,

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[7] 張西平、馬西尼《中外文學交流史：中國－義大利卷》（濟南：山東教育出版社，2015 年），頁 170。

[8] 〈"中國孤兒"在義大利：梅塔斯塔齊奧筆下的"中國英雄"〉，出自王甯、葛桂錄等著，《神奇的想像：南北歐作家與中國文化》（銀川：寧夏人民出版社，2005 年），頁 210-217。

[9] 哈布斯堡（Habsburg）為歐洲歷史上統治地域最廣的王室，存續超過六百多年。16 世紀中葉，哈布斯堡家族分為奧地利與西班牙兩個分支。奧地利分支在 1740 年男嗣斷絕，於是瑪麗亞·特蕾莎與洛林

1708-1765），原為洛林公爵，婚後在妻子的扶助下成為哈布斯堡－洛林王朝的神聖羅馬帝國皇帝，因而瑪麗亞・特蕾莎亦為洛林公爵夫人與神聖羅馬帝國皇后。

嚴格來說，瑪麗亞・特蕾莎在奧地利的職銜是「女大公」而非「女王」，然而，她的統治範圍覆蓋奧地利、匈牙利王國、克羅埃西亞、波希米亞、特蘭西瓦尼亞、曼托瓦、米蘭、加利西亞和洛多梅里亞、奧屬尼德蘭及帕爾馬等，的確身兼匈牙利等王國的女王，所以稱之為「奧地利女王」雖不精確，但無可厚非。至於「神聖羅馬帝國皇后」之稱雖然無誤，反而難以彰顯瑪麗亞・特蕾莎超越其王夫的權勢。頭銜之取捨本屬小節，卻反映出歐洲當時政治局勢之複雜，而政治局勢與文化發展息息相關，若無較深入認識，描述難免有所偏誤。

瑪麗亞・特蕾莎女王親自參與了《中國英雄》的首次演唱，而且，這並非以她為首的維也納宮廷中皇室成員、貴婦和騎士首次粉墨登場，飾唱自娛──甚至不是他們首次演出中國素材的戲劇：早在十七年前，1735 年 5 月 30 日，維也納狂歡節期間，皇族成員們就曾粉墨登場演唱一齣：「中國舞會」(Ballo Chinese)，作為一場「中國舞會」正式開始之前的助興歌劇。這部歌劇的劇本同樣出自梅塔斯塔齊奧手筆，後來經過修訂，並改名《中國女子》(Le Cinesi)出版。[10]這些無疑都是十八世紀「中國熱」在奧地利維也納的體現。

《中國英雄》最初預定供宮廷貴婦和騎士們演出，的確影響了這部戲劇的形式和內涵──因為「中國熱」而採用中國素材，就是其中之一。另一方面，將劇本改編為符合古典「三一律」，是否「由於皇后遵從文藝復興時期義大利的戲曲理論」，亦值得商榷：粗略來說，瑪麗亞・特蕾莎自是遵從三一律，然而，這一點並不需要女王特別指示，因為，梅塔斯塔齊奧本身就是義大利戲曲的代表人物之一，更是三一律的維護者。維也納方面聘請他擔任宮廷詩人、大量採用他的劇本，即已表示對義大利戲曲的崇尚。[11]

何況，在當時的歐洲，並不只是神聖羅馬帝國皇后和義大利文學家，即使是法國偉大思想家伏爾泰(Voltaire, 1694-1778)，[12]寫作劇本時也謹守「三一律」。所以，在佈局上，伏爾泰的《中國孤兒》與梅塔斯塔齊奧《中國英雄》有許多相似之處。

家族聯姻，創建了哈布斯堡－洛林皇朝。參考：彼得·賈德森(Pieter M. Judson)；楊樂言譯，《哈布斯堡王朝》（中信出版社，2017 年），第 1 章〈誕生於偶然的帝國・性別與帝國〉，頁 8-13。衛克安(Andrew Wheatcroft)，李丹莉、韓微譯，《哈布斯堡王朝：翱翔歐洲 700 年的雙頭鷹》（中信出版社，2017 年），頁 271-279。

[10] Burney, Charles, *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Abate Metastasio : including translations of his principal letters*,1796., Vol. 1, p. 159 所記述，和 Vol. 2, p. 91 所載梅塔斯塔齊奧本人 1754 年 3 月 9 日書信所言。https://archive.org/details/memoirslifeandw01burngoog/page/n11 （擷取日期：2019 年 1 月 9 日）另可參考：羅基敏，〈由《中國女子》到《女人的公敵》—十八世紀義大利歌劇中的「中國」〉，收於羅基敏，《文話／文化音樂：音樂與文學之文化場域》（臺北：高談文化出版事業有限公司，1999 年），頁 79-126。

[11] 其中包含政治考量，因為「神聖羅馬帝國皇帝」的榮銜，哈布斯堡「歷代皇帝都與義大利形成了奇特的紐帶關係」，參考：西蒙・溫德爾(Simon Winder)著，于江霞譯，《多瑙河畔：哈布斯堡的歐洲》（上海：上海社會科學院出版社，2019 年），第一章〈被選中的皇帝們〉，頁 32。

[12] 伏爾泰，原名 François-Marie Arouet，法國啟蒙時代思想家、哲學家、文學家，啟蒙運動的領袖，以捍衛公民自由和司法公正而聞名，被稱為「法蘭西思想之父」。

另外，因為忽略了《中國英雄》從一開始就是作為歌劇被演出，在許多研究中，亦常忽略其作曲者：朱塞佩・博諾(Giuseppe Bonno, 1711-1788)，[13]當時是維也納宮廷作曲家，而梅塔斯塔齊奧當時正擔任維也納宮廷詩人，所以他的多部劇本都首先由博諾譜成樂曲，例如：《牧人王》(Il re pastore)、《無人島》(L'isola disabitata)等。其中有數部劇本，之後再被多位晚輩作曲家譜曲，包括海頓 (Haydn, 1732-1809)和莫札特(Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart , 1756 –1791)等後人熟知的維也納古典樂派大師。[14]梅塔斯塔齊奧這些劇本之廣受作曲家注目，博諾實功不可没。

《中國英雄》在梅塔斯塔齊奧完成劇本的同年，就立刻由博諾譜曲，之後即製作上演。如此，下旨創作的瑪麗亞・特蕾莎女王原本就屬意《中國英雄》為宮廷詩人梅塔斯塔齊奧和宮廷作曲家博諾聯手合作的歌劇。因而，討論《中國英雄》時，實不應忽略其音樂合作者。

博諾生前是維也納音樂界的顯赫人物，寫作神劇、彌撒曲等宗教音樂和舞臺作品。其中至少有三十部歌劇，大半是為官方經營的維也納城堡劇院，或者甚布倫宮的貴族宴會而譜寫。其餘作品則為奧地利其他城市，如拉克森堡(Laxenburg)等，也有些為了其他國家，如西班牙的阿蘭惠斯(Aranjuez)等譜寫，在當時是一位國際知名的作曲家。

博諾在 1736 年至 1750 年代中期，譜寫了大量歌劇，不僅幾乎年年有新劇問世，還不乏一年有兩、三齣的情況。1752 年，41 歲譜寫《中國英雄》時，正是博諾在樂壇和宮廷中地位穩固，也是他歌劇創作鼎盛期的最後階段。他與梅塔斯塔齊奧合作的《中國英雄》受到好評後亦跨越國界流傳：次年就曾在羅馬出版樂譜，1755 年 9 月 23 日在西班牙巴塞隆聖十字劇院(Teatre de la Santa Creu)上演，之後 1795 年和 1834 年兩個威尼斯出版的樂譜至今仍存，另有至少一個日期不詳的版本。如此成功，應有助於吸引其他作曲家陸續投入創作各自的《中國英雄》歌劇。

博諾自 1736 年成為維也納宮廷作曲家。當時，熱愛音樂的貴族之宮廷，往往設有多個音樂職位，招聘多位音樂家以各司其職，而作為當時歐洲最重要政治勢力之一的哈布斯堡－洛林王朝，其皇族多位成員均熱衷贊助藝術，首都維也納的帝國宮廷音樂職位自然不少。原本，多個重要職位都集中於奧、法兩國皆受寵榮的音樂家格魯克(Christoph Willibald Gluck, 1714-1787)一身，[15]而他於 1787 年逝世，後輩音樂家們爭相求取他留下的職缺，卻無人擁有其威望，結果是原屬格魯克一人的多個頭銜被分散給多人。後世最著名的音樂家──莫札特也分得了其中之一，並於此後自稱「宮廷樂長」。然而，莫札特實際上得到的是較低層級的「宮廷室內樂作曲家」一職，而真正最高等級的「宮廷樂長」之職，就是由博諾獲得。

以上事蹟中，值得注意的是：在當時的維也納、奧地利、甚至整個歐洲，博諾的聲名地位比起身為晚輩的「音樂神童」莫札特有過之而無不及──與後世的評價恰恰相

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[13] 博諾雖生於維也納，但為義大利裔，因音樂天份，15 歲就被送到那不勒斯深造。1736 年回到維也納，即在宮廷擔任音樂工作；可說是官方特定送他到義大利栽培以為宮廷所用，亦顯示出當時對義大利地區文學和音樂等的喜愛。

[14] 參考：Daniel Heartz: *Haydn, Mozart and the Viennese School 1740–1780*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 115–120。

[15] 格魯克，日耳曼作曲家，一生創作了百餘部歌劇：包括義大利田園劇和法國喜歌劇。1762 年，他在《奧菲歐與尤麗狄茜》中嘗試改革，創立了新的義大利歌劇風格，奠基了現代歌劇的基礎。

反。如此，則博諾在十八世紀當時的音樂、歌劇，還有本文所討論之「中國熱」相關領域所扮演的角色或起的作用，也比莫札特等後世更廣為人知的創作家有過之而無不及。

三、跨出國界和階級——《中國英雄》在威尼斯

《中外文學交流史：中國－義大利卷》中提及：「《中國英雄》於 1752 年完成，並於同年在奧地利皇家劇院首演」，「深受觀眾歡迎的這部歌劇又於次年在威尼斯重新上演。」[16]《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》第四章〈義大利式中國風〉亦指出：

> 1753 年，威尼斯的觀眾還有幸看到了一部真正中國戲劇的改編：梅塔斯塔西奧(Mestastasio)的歌劇版《趙氏孤兒》，劇名為“中國孤兒”。劇中情節如同伏爾泰的《中國孤兒》一樣同樣取自原作……。[17]

此處將《中國英雄》和《中國孤兒》並舉，事實上，伏爾泰的這部作品要晚兩年才問世。

18 世紀中期，威尼斯共和國的榮光將盡；18 世紀晚期，遭到法國和奧地利數度輪番占領，直到 19 世紀義大利王國統一，才脫離奧地利。《中國英雄》跨出國界，1753 年 5 月 30 日首先在威尼斯的博覽會期間，於聖莫伊斯的朱斯蒂安娜劇院(Teatro Giustinian di San Moisé)上演。在奧地利實際軍事佔領之前，擔任維也納宮廷詩人的義大利人梅塔斯塔齊為奧地利皇室寫作的《中國英雄》出國後首先在威尼斯上演，極可能帶著攏絡親近意味。

從文化的角度來看，當時的威尼斯正盛行異國風，而中國風也流行有年：

> 18 世紀早期的舞臺上，圓筒尖頂帽，色彩俗麗的長袍和一雙腳尖上翹的鞋就已足夠裝扮出一個中國人，到了中國風鼎盛的 18 世紀中期，開始出現地道的中式服裝。[18]

威尼斯作為重要的中介貿易海洋城市，自古就比大多歐洲其他城市更常接觸東方文化；在大航海時代，更是引入東方文化的重要窗口。威尼斯的異國風之興盛，可謂領先歐洲。

共和國的自由風氣，保障了非歐洲文化和天主教思想刊物的出版，和相關的創作。自十五世紀後半，威尼斯已是歐洲最重要的出版和書籍重鎮之一。[19]在當地上演的作

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[16] 張西平、馬西尼，《中外文學交流史：中國－義大利卷》，頁 170。

[17] 昂納著，劉愛英、秦紅譯，《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》，第四章〈義大利式中國風〉，頁 151。

[18] 同上註。

[19] 陣內秀信著，李雨青譯，《義大利‧海洋城市的精神：中世紀城市如何展開空間美學和歷史》（新北：八旗文化出版社，2019 年），序章〈於現代復甦的中世紀海洋城市，來自東方的影響〉，頁 29-30；第一章〈水上城市——威尼斯‧伊斯蘭的科學與出版文化〉，頁 89-91。威廉‧麥克尼爾(William H. McNeill)

品，比起維也納宮廷的貴族，更廣泛地向各階層民眾拓展，[20]也形成了更嚴苛的市場競爭。

為了與同行對手作出區別，不同的創作家採納不同的異國風格。劇作家哥爾多尼(Carlo Osvaldo Goldoni, 1707-1793)於 1753 年推出《波斯新娘》(La sposa persiana)，[21]而與他激烈競爭的對手彼得羅・基亞里(Pietro Chiari, 1712–1785)即以中國素材的劇本加以對抗：[22]

> 彼得羅・基亞里(Pietro Chiari)宣稱他的劇作《中國女奴》開創了威尼斯的新時尚(1752 年狂歡節首演)，這齣有關身份錯位的喜劇情節曲折，極為成功，他隨即寫了續集《中國姐妹》，並在次年上演。兩部劇對東方及其華麗風俗的描繪並不準確，卻頗有趣味。[23]

梅塔斯塔齊的《中國英雄》跨出國界的第一站，就處於此種潮流之中。其後，威尼斯的中國風又持續了多年：1757 年，哥爾多尼也加入中國風行列，以筆名 Polisseno Fegeio 撰寫腳本、由朱塞佩・史卡拉第(Giuseppe Scarlatti)譜曲的《荒島》(L'isola disabitata)，又稱《迷失的中國女子》上演；[24] 1771 年，曾為那不勒斯譜寫《中國英雄》的加露皮(Baldassare Galuppi, 1706 –1785，詳見本文第五節)再度為威尼斯採用中國題材的劇本譜曲，腳本出自喬萬尼.貝爾塔迪(Giovanni Bertati)之手的《女人的公敵》(L'inimico delle donne)。[25]

基亞里宣稱自己的《中國女奴》開創了威尼斯的新時尚，然而，劇中藉一位人物對馬可・波羅(Marco Polo, 1254-1324)大加稱頌，顯示這位威尼斯共和國商人的遊記對四百多年後故鄉之中國風的影響，[26]然則威尼斯的中國風可謂淵遠流長，雖其間或有冷熱興衰，固非全然同於十八世紀歐洲各國相對短暫的中國熱現象之一環。

另外，因為作曲者常受到冷落，所以上述研究都忽略了：威尼斯上演的《中國英

著，許可欣譯，《威尼斯共和國的故事：西歐的屏障與文明的門戶》(臺北，廣場出版，2012 年)，第五章〈一四八一年至一六六九年，文化大都會的威尼斯〉中〈活躍的威尼斯文化〉、〈各國對異教徒的態度〉、〈洋溢自由風氣的威尼斯〉三節。

[20] 歌劇開始於佛羅倫斯和羅馬，後來重鎮逐漸漸轉移到威尼斯。1637 年，威尼斯建立了史上第一座公開歌劇院：聖卡西亞諾劇院(Teatro di San Cassiano)，平民開始可以欣賞歌劇，到了 17 世紀末，歌劇成為廣受大眾歡迎的音樂活動，威尼斯的歌劇形式居領導全歐音樂活動的地位，歐洲各地競相效仿。那不勒斯樂派在前述城市的基礎上，將義大利歌劇帶到最高峰。

[21] 哥爾多尼，出生於威尼斯共和國的劇作家。他一生創作了大量的劇本，被翻譯成多種文字，《一僕二主》(Il servitore di due padroni)等至今仍在世界各地上演。

[22] 彼得羅・基亞里，義大利天主教牧師、劇作家和小說家劇作家。創作超過 60 部劇本，其中包括：《阿爾及爾的威尼斯人》(La Veneziana in Algeri)、《蒙古的威尼斯醫生》(Il Medico Veneziano al Mongol)、《庫里汗之死》(La Morte di Kouli-Kan)等多部異國素材劇作。

[23] 昂納著，劉愛英、秦紅譯，《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》，第四章〈義大利式中國風〉，頁 151-152。

[24] 畢明輝，《20 世紀西方音樂中的中國因素》(上海音樂學院出版社，2007 年)，第一章〈歷史的回顧〉第二節〈18 世紀〉，頁 5。

[25] Adrienne Ward, *Pagodas in Play: China on the Eighteenth-century Italian Opera Stage*, p.154.

[26] 〈"中國孤兒"在義大利：梅塔斯塔齊奧筆下的"中國英雄"〉，出自王甯，葛桂錄等著，《神奇的想像：南北歐作家與中國文化》，頁 211。

雄》並非維也納的首演版本，而是另有不同的音樂。遺憾的是，目前樂譜雖存，其上並未記載作曲家的姓名。[27]足見《中國英雄》乃至於中國風的相關史料，仍有大量闕漏或佚失的環節，等待後人發掘和梳理。

四、葡萄牙里斯本的義大利歌劇風潮與《中國英雄》

1753 年 6 月 6 日，葡萄牙的里斯本也上演了《中國英雄》。音樂不同於一個星期之前威尼斯那齣，也非出自維也納的博諾，而是達維德·佩雷斯(David Pérez, 1711 – 1778)。

佩雷斯並非葡萄牙人，而是來自那不勒斯(Napoli)。那不勒斯在當時的歐洲屬音樂先進都市，不僅是最早建立孩童音樂教育機構的城市之一，那不勒斯樂派在當時的樂壇──尤其是歌劇領域──更是舉足輕重。[28]

以軍政形勢而言，那不勒斯長期受歐洲各重要政治勢力的爭奪。在佩雷斯出生之時，那不勒斯還由奧地利哈布斯堡君王查理六世從維也納委派總督進行管理。不過，因波蘭王位繼承戰爭，1738 年維也納條約訂立，改由西班牙波旁王室的卡洛斯三世(Carlos III, 1716-1788)統治，而獲得獨立地位。所以，當地的音樂家受到不同勢力的貴族們看重，他們的音樂也流傳到許多國家地區。

佩雷斯在家鄉完成學業後，1733 年立刻受到當時還是帕爾馬公爵的卡洛斯三世招聘。帕爾馬公爵於 1735 年即位為西班牙國王，並身兼西西里和那不勒斯國王，所以隨後數年間，佩雷斯隨侍國王，同時活躍於巴勒摩和那不勒斯兩個首府。他的歌劇還在羅馬、佛羅倫薩、威尼斯、米蘭、都靈和維也納等大城市上演，名蜚國際。

1752 年，葡萄牙國王若澤一世(José I, 1714-1777）以高額薪資延請佩雷斯擔任宮廷合唱團樂長和皇家音樂教師。當時若澤一世即位不久，一改其父王只關心教堂音樂的政策，而將義大利歌劇視為宮廷的重心。聘請了多位著名設計師，為佩雷斯的歌劇製作華麗的布景，並召募當紅的歌手演唱。葡萄牙宮廷的富豐的音樂和戲劇資源，使佩雷斯甘心終老於里斯本，也使義大利歌劇在葡萄牙的首都蔚為風潮。第三齣上演的即《中國英雄》,就在佩雷斯移居里斯本的次年,成為這股潮流中推出的先鋒劇作之一。

佩雷斯生前無疑是名聲很高的音樂家。在樂壇競爭激烈的那不勒斯時，歌劇院經理人就盛讚佩雷斯和裴高雷西(Giovanni Battista Pergolesi, 1710-1736)兩人是「這個城市最棒的名家」。[29]而且,裴高雷西雖在後世更為知名,在當時他的歌劇上演時多所失敗,相反地，佩雷斯的作品總是大獲成功。

[27] 該樂譜現藏於義大利米蘭國家圖書館；美國華盛頓國會圖書館音樂部藏有副本。

[28] 以音樂作為謀生手段而設的機構，起於義大利地區的慈善組織。第一所為 1346 年建立於威尼斯的慈善收養院，院生僅限於女孤兒，而第一所收容男孤兒的類似機構，即那不勒斯於 1537 年創辦的洛雷托聖瑪麗亞音樂學院。至於歐洲各國正規的音樂教育機構之建立，多數已至 18 世紀中晚葉。那不勒斯樂派(Neapolitan Music School)於 17 世紀末形成。18 世紀初，其歌劇風格傳遍德、奧、英、法各國。早期創作皆為正歌劇，後期則出現以市民生活為題材、劇情詼諧、音樂質樸的喜歌劇，兩者在西方音樂史上都影響深遠。參考：Don Michael Randel, *The Harvard Dictionary of Music* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 549。

[29] 裴高雷西，義大利作曲家。26 歲英年早逝，最後作品《聖母悼歌》為 18 世紀經典樂作。其幕間劇《女僕作夫人》（1733 年）被譽為義大利喜歌劇的先驅，下文所提及的法國「喜歌劇之爭」爭論的核心人物之一，對歐洲喜歌劇和古典時期音樂風格的發展有重大影響。

佩雷斯的名聲也跨越國際：遠在法國巴黎發生的「喜歌劇之爭」中，[30]盧梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778)於 1753 年 11 月刊行《論法國音樂的信》(Lettre sur la musique française)，[31]稱讚義大利音樂風格大膽的轉調為法國音樂所不及，並將波爾博拉(Porpora)、加露皮(Baldassare Galuppi, 1706 –1785)、科奇(Cocchi)、約梅利(Jommelli)、特拉德拉(Terradellas)和佩雷茲並列為「激動人心的大師們」。即使晚年創作主要侷限在宗教音樂，和不肯離開葡萄牙，使佩雷斯的國際聲望逐漸降低，1766 年佩雷斯的作品在日耳曼地區仍相當知名，且作品有著很大需求。1774 年，儘管他本人未到英國，倫敦的古代音樂學院仍以鼓掌方式通過佩雷斯成為院士。1790 年他仍是「義大利大師中最有名的和受歡迎的作曲家之一」。

德國音樂學家克雷茨施馬爾也指出：自 1750 年代，佩雷斯的歌劇中對管弦樂掌握經常顯示出優於同時代的義大利歌劇樂派的作品，佩雷斯結合經修改的巴洛克戲劇和當時更先進的最新音樂風格。他的傑出歌劇「屬於大師之作的前列......豐富的創意和情感，獨具匠心的形式和意義，一切盡在其中，這造就了一個藝術的高峰」，而且，「如果那不勒斯學派所有的歌劇作曲家都擁有他的特點，就不需要格魯克（的改革）」，[32]足見他的成就與地位。

佩雷斯也和上一節的博諾類似，是屬於身後不如生前名望的音樂家。這兩位《中國英雄》作曲家同年出生，可謂並世之才。而且，比起博諾僅於少年時期到那不勒斯留學，佩雷斯更是當地土生土長，自幼即親炙那不勒斯樂派，其聲名有過之而無不及。後人在接受他們現在的評價時，亦不應忽略：以他們生前的地位，譜寫《中國英雄》等以中華文化為素材的作品，對在當時歐洲流行的中國風之助益。

佩雷斯一生至少譜寫了 44 齣歌劇，其中採用了 15 部梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本，佔了三分之一；梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本在當時之受歡迎，可見一斑。1752 年秋天，佩雷斯在里斯本宮廷劇院(Teatro di Corte)首演的第一部歌劇，劇本就是梅塔斯塔齊奧的《戴莫封特王》（Demofoonte）。1753 至 1755 年，佩雷斯更連續三年推出四部以梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本譜成的歌劇，都獲得極大成功，其中就包括 1753 年 6 月 6 日首演的《中國英雄》。

葡萄牙是由海路最先抵達中國沿岸的歐洲國家。在大航海時代之初，教皇烏爾班六世(Urban VI)將探索「未被發現的世界」的東邊的權力，交與了葡萄牙人。1517 年，多默・皮列士（Tomé Pires, 1465?－1524?）率領的葡萄牙船抵達中國海岸，向明朝政府要求建立關係。[33]在經歷許多波折後，1557 年，葡萄牙獲明朝官方許可，在澳門租

[30] 喜歌劇之爭(Querelle des Bouffons)，又譯為「丑角之爭」。喜歌劇產生於 1720-30 年代的義大利，多取材於日常生活中的場景，以平民為主角。喜歌劇的興起給義大利正歌劇和法國大歌劇擊大的打擊，並啟發對歌劇的改革，因而引起許多論爭。

[31]盧梭，啟蒙時代的法國與日內瓦哲學家、政治理論家和作曲家。其《愛彌兒》是教育哲學上劃時代的偉大作品；《社會契約論》論述人民主權與民主政治哲學思想，為西方政治思想的最有影響力的著作之一。

[32] Hermann Kretzschmar, *Geschichte der Oper*, (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1919, p. 187-189, https://archive.org/details/geschichtederope00kret/page/188 （擷取日期：2019 年 4 月 22 日）

[33] 多默・皮列士，澳門地區譯為道咩卑利士，葡萄牙的藥劑師、作家、水手和財政大臣，是明朝以來，葡萄牙乃至整個西方世界首位進入中國的使者。時為明武宗朝，正德十三年(1518 年)，他獲准在廣州登陸，不久前往南京，獲得正在南巡的的武宗接見，然後隨駕到北京。武宗駕崩後，中葡爆發屯門海

用土地，開展貿易，此後近三個世紀的時間裡，澳門成為中國和外面世界之間最為重要的橋梁。整個 16 世紀直至 17 世紀，葡萄牙人，和後來加入的西班牙人牢牢地控制著這條貿易路線，而中國的物品就通過他們的船隻，到達了歐洲其他國家。[34]

在威尼斯的貿易實力逐漸衰落的同時，葡萄牙為首的航海路線成為東方－中國物品和文化輸入歐洲的新重要管道。由此可見，《中國英雄》僅慢了威尼斯 7 天就在里斯本上演，並非都是梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本和佩雷斯的音樂之功，亦是葡萄牙的中國風由來已久，早已為中國題材戲劇奠下了被接受的基礎。

五、《中國英雄》在那不勒斯與西班牙

1753 年，繼威尼斯和里斯本，那不勒斯也於 7 月 10 日首演了另一齣《中國英雄》，作曲家為加露皮。加露皮出生於布拉諾島(Burano)，當時屬威尼斯共和國，至今這座島上的主要街道和中心廣場仍以加露皮命名，並立有其雕像，可見對他的尊崇。

加露皮不僅在故鄉受到肯定，更取得了國際性成功，在維也納、英國倫敦和俄羅斯聖彼得堡都有過一段輝煌的職業經歷，但他最主要活動的據點依然是威尼斯，堪稱當地音樂界的領導人物。在職業生涯的早期，加露皮以正歌劇得到相當成功，但從 1740 年代，他和編劇家哥爾多尼合作，以新喜歌劇風格(dramma giocoso style)聞名全歐洲，而被後世譽為「喜歌劇之父」。

同時，他的一些成熟的正歌劇仍廣受歡迎，其中多部以梅塔斯塔齊奧劇本譜寫。《中國英雄》上演的那一年，盧梭《論法國音樂的信》將加露皮、佩雷茲和其他幾位義大利音樂家並列為「激動人心的大師們」。1750 年代中期，當時的音樂學界稱加露皮為「在任何地方都是最受歡迎的歌劇作曲家」。

在哥爾多尼捲入威尼斯的異國風劇本競爭時，身處同一個藝術市場的加露皮也沒有自外於這股潮流。不過，正處於如日中天階段的他沒有選擇多次合作的搭檔哥爾多尼的阿拉伯題材劇本，也沒有在本國正面和梅塔斯塔齊奧的《中國英雄》對抗，而是採用這個劇本另譜一齣歌劇，在 40 天後，7 月 10 日於那不勒斯的聖卡洛斯劇院首演。

加露皮的《中國英雄》也獲得成功，並傳至其他國家城市，例如 1766 年 4 月 12 日跨海到英國倫敦著名的乾草市場(Haymarket)國王劇院上演，進一步擴大了《中國英雄》傳播的地區。

那不勒斯當時也受到中國風的浸染，當地波爾蒂奇(Portici)的皇家別墅被譽為「義大利最華麗的中國風作品」。兼任那不勒斯國王的卡洛斯三世一繼承西班牙王位，就迫不及待地命那不勒斯的卡波迪蒙特工廠主要技師到馬德里附近複製這座宮殿。這座新宮殿更後來居上，青出於藍，被譽為歐洲中國風裝飾最高成就之一，在西班牙更是首屈一指。[35]

戰，皮列士被明世宗下令押解到廣州聽候處置。一說嘉靖三年（1524）病死於廣州監獄；亦有記載他至 1540 年死於江蘇。皮列士寫作的《東方志：從紅海到中國》（Suma Oriental que trata do Mar Roxo até aos Chins，中文版：何高濟譯，江蘇教育出版社，2005 年）是歐洲第一部介紹馬來西亞以及最古老和最廣泛的描述葡屬東方的著作，為關於對亞洲貿易的里程碑式著作。

[34] 樊樹志，《晚明史（1573—1644 年（上卷）》（上海：復旦大學出版社，2003 年），〈地理大發現後的全球經濟與晚明社會〉，頁 6-7。

[35] 昂納著，劉愛英、秦紅譯，《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》第四章，〈義大利式中國風〉，

1752 年，卡洛斯三世傑出的宮廷音樂家佩雷斯被葡萄牙挖角；1753 年，佩雷斯《中國英雄》上演才一個月，卡洛斯三世的宮廷就緊跟著推出另一位作曲家加露皮的同劇本戲碼。或為彌補遺憾，或存競爭心態，博諾《中國英雄》在兩年後 1755 年 9 月 23 日也在西班牙巴塞隆聖十字劇院(Teatre de la Santa Creu)上演，可見對卡洛斯三世統治區域對中國風之熱愛。

另外，卡洛斯三世當初在波蘭王位繼承戰爭期間，趁奧地利無暇南顧，奪取了原由哈布斯堡王室統領的那不勒斯和西西里。如今接連上演義大利代表詩人梅塔斯塔齊奧為維也納宮廷寫作的《中國英雄》，除了中國風題材和義大利戲曲的魅力，可能也有藉此與敵國互別苗頭，或爭奪在義大利地區文化認同感的意味。

另外，值得注意的是：義大利當時尚未統一。所以，佩雷斯的故鄉那不勒斯和加露皮的出生地布拉諾島，還有梅塔斯塔齊奧的故鄉羅馬，在十八世紀分屬那不勒斯王國、威尼斯共和國，還有教皇國，加上奧地利、西班牙、法國等政治勢力競爭兼領，情勢更複雜。[36]

文化方面，各地也有所差異。梅塔斯塔齊奧的故鄉羅馬當時已不再是引領歌劇風潮的重鎮，沒有積極上演《中國英雄》。那不勒斯雖然中國風興盛，但週邊其他義大利南部城市卻沒有同樣現象。[37]凡此種種，不能因為這些城市在今日都屬於義大利，即等同視之、一概而論。

六、《中國英雄》在德勒斯登

第五部《中國英雄》的作曲者約翰•阿道夫•哈塞（Johann Adolph Hassen, 1699-1783）出身於貝格多夫(Bergedorf)，與漢堡(Hamburg)鄰近。[38]他最晚在 1722 年已經離開日耳曼地區，1720 年代有六、七年在義大利地區生活，曾向那不勒斯樂派大師亞歷山德羅•史卡拉蒂(Alessandro Scarlatti, 1660-1725)學習。期間，哈塞的歌劇就大獲成功：那不勒斯、威尼斯、都靈、羅馬各宮廷或歌劇院爭相委託他創作。其中多部作品在當時非常流行，例如改編自梅塔斯塔齊奧劇本的《阿塔瑟斯》(Artaserse)，首演時由當時的著名歌手法里內利(Farinelli)飾唱主角，其音樂歷久不衰。後來，法里內利供職於西班牙宮廷時，國王腓力五世每晚都要求聆聽法里內利演唱其中兩首詠嘆調，時間長達十年。

1730 年，哈塞被任命德勒斯登宮廷樂長，重回日耳曼地區。不過，他此時的僱主「強力王」奧古斯都二世(Friedrich August I der Starke, 1670-1733)，和後來繼任的「肥胖王」奧古斯特三世(August III. von Polen, 1696-1763)，父子都身兼神聖羅馬帝國薩克森選帝侯與波蘭國王，所以哈塞必須隨侍奔波於德勒斯登和華沙兩處宮廷，為他們創作的樂曲也在兩處輪流上演。另一方面，其他地區柏林、巴黎等城市仍常延請他製作

頁 155-157。

[36] 威廉・吉塞布萊希特(Wilhelm von Glesebrecht)著，邱瑞晶譯，《德意志皇帝史(卷一)：從查理大帝到奧托三世》（吉林：吉林出版社，2018 年）第三篇，〈佔領義大利王國〉頁 305-307。

[37] 昂納著，劉愛英、秦紅譯，《中國風：遺失在西方 800 年的中國元素》第四章，〈義大利式中國風〉，頁 157。

[38] 漢堡，全稱為漢堡漢薩自由市（Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg），位於今日德國北部的港口城市，是僅次於首都柏林的第二大城市。漢堡的風氣在日耳曼城邦中特別開明，日耳曼地區的第一座為所有階層人士而非只為貴族階級開放的公共歌劇院，即於 1678 在漢堡落成。

歌劇，所以他的作品廣泛流傳於歐洲各地。

奧地利的瑪麗亞・特蕾莎女王非常喜愛哈塞的樂曲，所以維也納方面多次委請哈塞製作歌劇。如此，自然增加了與身為維也納宮廷詩人的梅塔斯塔齊奧合作的機會。事實上，哈塞已曾多次採用梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本譜寫歌劇，但早期他常都為了演出和譜曲方便，對文詞進行極多改編。後來，哈塞對梅塔斯塔齊奧的劇本日益尊重。1740年代初期，他開始全然按梅塔斯塔齊奧原文譜曲，獲得尊重的劇作家與作曲家之間的私人關係顯著改善。

特別是 1750 年代中期以後，因為七年戰爭迫使德勒斯登宮廷遷往華沙、[39]薩克森選帝侯兼波蘭國王頻繁更替、攝政王母忽視音樂藝術等因素，哈塞在義大利地區生活時間居多。1760 年的秋天，哈塞移居到維也納兩年；1764 年，他再次回到維也納居留至 1773 年。因為深受哈布斯堡皇室愛重，幾乎擔負了真正的宮廷作曲家之職。自 1743 年至 1771 年，梅塔斯塔齊奧有六部劇本都首先由哈塞為之譜曲，比起包括博諾在內的一眾維也納宮廷音樂家都多。當時著名的英國音樂史學家伯尼(Charles Burney, 1726–1814)讚美：

> 這兩位詩人和音樂家可謂兩個「半身」，如同柏拉圖的雌雄同體，原本就構成一個整體；因為他們擁有真正的天才，品味和判斷標準的相同特徵；所以適當性、一致性，清晰度和精確度，完全一致，如同兩個不可分割的彼此……。[40]

另一位音樂學者將哈塞、佩雷斯和帕伊謝洛(Giovanni Paisiello, 1740-1816)並列為「最令人滿意的典範」。同時的音樂界晚輩，海頓以獲得哈塞稱讚為榮；[41]莫札特之父里奧波德以神童愛子受到梅塔斯塔齊奧和哈塞支持為傲，甚至稱後者為「音樂之父」，[42]足見哈塞在當時樂壇的地位。

後世音樂史學家指出：梅塔斯塔齊奧和哈塞這一對搭擋就如同是「創造了正歌劇這一標準類型」，而哈塞個人與韓德爾、史卡拉蒂等並列為正歌劇最重要的作曲家之一。「當時主導者歐洲舞臺的約翰・阿道夫・哈塞」，「很長一段時間，哈塞一直是那不勒斯歌劇學派一言九鼎的歐洲權威，他的歌劇系列誠為一代作曲家的樣板」，在歌劇發展和 18 世紀音樂上都是位舉足輕重的人物。[43]哈塞是前五部《中國英雄》已知的四位作

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39 七年戰爭，主要衝突集中於 1756 年-1763 年，故有此稱。經常被視為奧地利王位繼承戰爭的延續，因普魯士腓特烈大帝意圖取代瑪麗亞・特蕾莎女王在日耳曼的共主地位，攻佔原屬奧地利的西利西亞省，於是雙方各與其他國家結盟對抗，導致當時歐洲主要強國均涉入，影響擴及其殖民地北美、中美洲、西非海岸、印度及菲律賓等地。

40 Burney, Charles, *An Eighteenth-Century Musical Tour In Central Europe And The Netherlands*, Vol-II,London,Oxford University Press, 1959 ,pp. 82-83. https://archive.org/details/eighteenthcentur007203mbp/page/n101(擷取日期：2019 年 12 月 8 日)

41 （德）克勞迪婭・瑪麗亞・克尼斯佩爾(Claudia Maria Knispel)著，李鷗譯，《海頓》(北京：人民音樂出版社，2008)，〈埃斯特哈澤的歌劇季〉，頁 82。

42 （英）伍德福特(Peggy Woodford)著，程秋堯譯，《莫札特》(臺北：智庫文化股份有限公司，1997)，頁 51。

43（德）尼古勞斯・德・帕萊齊厄(Nikolaus de Palézieux)著，王劍南譯，《格魯克》（北京：人民音樂出

曲家中最年長的一位，生前的地位亦堪稱最高的一位。

1753 年 10 月 7 日，約翰・阿道夫・哈塞的《中國英雄》首演於薩克森首府德勒斯登的胡貝圖斯堡(Hubertusburg)宮廷劇院，[44]獲得成功。目前所知，次年，1754 年 7 月，該劇就又在漢堡的龍騎兵廄舍劇院(Theater am Dragoner-Stall in Hamburg)上演，之後在各地演出和出版。至 20 年後，哈塞還再次改編修訂此劇，在柏林宮廷演出。

如同義大利，當時的德國也尚未統一。上述哈塞《中國英雄》上演的三座城市：德勒斯登當時屬於薩克森選帝侯和波蘭國王，漢堡屬於哈布斯堡－洛林王朝的神聖羅馬帝國皇帝直轄「漢薩自由城市」（Freie Hansestadt），而柏林則為新興的普魯士王國之首都。

哈塞《中國英雄》也有相應的中國風流行環境，他的僱主「強力王」奧古斯都二世對中國事物——特別是「白色的黃金」—瓷器極度狂熱。他的朝臣為了扼止君主為收集瓷器的漫無節制開支，指派鍊金術士研究，在歐洲首先發現了中國製造瓷器的秘訣。奧古斯都二世年輕時曾造訪過法國凡爾賽宮，對「太陽王」路易十四的絕對王權與華麗排場非常仰慕。[45]他登基後，從歐洲各地招攬了許多傑出建築師和畫家；像路易十四聘請了義大利音樂家拉摩（Jean-Philippe Rameau, 1683－1764）般，[46]奧古斯都二世也聘請了在義大利成名的哈塞。在這位君王的旨意下，德勒斯登的音樂生活開始興盛，而《中國英雄》在此種風潮中上演，可謂法國與義大利兩方的中國風之結合。

版社，2008 年)，〈序言〉：「梅塔斯塔西奧和哈塞這一對搭擋就如同是創造了《歌劇系列》這一標準類型」，唯翻譯有誤，「歌劇系列」應為「正歌劇」(Opera Seria，或譯為「莊歌劇」)，參見原文。其實，正歌劇在 1710 年代，他們合作之前就已確立，但兩人於此一劇類的成就和影響力之大，無可否認。

44 在部份資料中記載哈塞《中國英雄》的首演地為柏林，腓特烈大帝御前，然而，筆者考察哈塞歷年有多部作品都在 10 月 7 日於薩克森選帝侯及波蘭國王宮廷首演，當為其時該國重大節日，不應僅於 1753 年例外。所謂哈塞《中國英雄》首演於柏林，應為 20 年後的新版之首演，兩者混淆。

45 佩里・安德森(Perry Anderson)著，劉北成、龔曉莊譯，《絕對主義國家的系譜》(上海：上海人民出版社，2001 年)，第一部分〈西歐・第四章 法國〉，頁 99-100；第二部分〈東歐・第四章 波蘭〉，頁 309-311。

46 拉莫（Jean-Philippe Rameau，1683－1764），法國巴洛克作曲家、音樂理論家。被譽為盧利之後最偉大的法國歌劇作曲家(Jean-Baptiste Lully)，並為歐洲和聲理論的重要奠基人。

七、結論

在 1752 年 5 月 13 日至 1753 年 10 月 7 日，不到一年半的時間，《中國英雄》這第一部改編自中國戲曲的歐洲戲劇就吸引了至少五位作曲家為之作曲，並在各地上演都獲得成功。以上僅是開端，隨著這五齣歌劇在不同城市上演、出版，之後更有十餘位作曲家加入創作，20 多齣歌劇《中國英雄》，將《趙氏孤兒》的故事架構傳播到歐洲許多地區。與義大利歌劇的結合，使中國題材的戲劇更廣為歐洲人士知曉，亦使十八世紀中華文化在歐洲的接受進入一個新階段。

值得重視的是：這五部《中國英雄》都早於 1755 年伏爾泰在巴黎將自己的《中國孤兒》搬上舞臺，所以，維也納、威尼斯、里斯本、那不勒斯和德勒斯登，甚至這些城市因為政治局勢或文化相關的多個地區，都不待伏爾泰《中國孤兒》問世，就已經接觸過《趙氏孤兒》的改編劇。研究《趙氏孤兒》乃至中國戲曲改編劇傳譯歐洲，實不應忽視《中國英雄》之地位。

「正歌劇之王」、「18 世紀第一位戲劇改革者」梅塔斯塔齊奧的成就集中在特定義大利文學體裁上，而不像「法蘭西思想之父」伏爾泰在思想方面有著普世名聲。然而，僅就當時歐洲戲劇界的名聲地位而言，梅塔斯塔齊奧的聲望實比伏爾泰有過之而無不及，而前者的《中國英雄》更比後者的《中國孤兒》還早上演和流傳。可是，後人──尤其是東方人，因為對梅塔斯塔齊奧相對較為陌生，有意無意間就心存梅塔斯塔齊奧的《中國英雄》不如伏爾泰《中國孤兒》的錯覺。

本文並未詳述《中國英雄》的作曲者們的生平，僅疏理他們在當時國際間的活動和名聲：與莫札特競爭勝出的「維也納宮廷作曲家」博諾、「激動人心的大師」佩雷斯、「喜歌劇之父」加露皮、「一代作曲家的榜板」哈塞，在當時對《中國英雄》等中國題材的劇作傳播，都有著貢獻。然而，他們卻與劇作家同樣，因身後聲名漸減，以致在當時的影響力常遭低估。

對「中國風」的傳播描述，亦難免類似錯覺。因為「中國風」自路易十四時期大行其道，其原文(“Chinoiserie”）亦為法文，所以後人討論時，往往有「中國風」始於法國，其他國度、地區均受其影響的偏差印象。

然而，在上述傳播概況中，除可見當時歐洲的中國風流行之廣，亦可見這五部《中國英雄》優先於這五座城市上演，實因此五處早已流行著中國風──具備接受中國素材戲作之條件。

可是，在本文所述五部《中國英雄》中，只有最後一部首演的德勒斯登，其風氣無疑受過法國的中國風影響。至於奧地利維也納、威尼斯、葡萄牙里斯本、那不勒斯，通過不同的歷史脈絡，都有著比法國更早的中國風淵源。

一個現象之創始、聲名、地位、成就、影響等，往往並非同一個層面，評述時不應混為一談，然而，對於 18 世紀中國風及《趙氏孤兒》之改編劇的討論，卻往往有簡化的狀況，例如：因為法國影響最鉅，就被誤認為中國風創始；因為伏爾泰比梅塔斯塔齊奧更為知名，就產生《中國孤兒》在當時較《中國英雄》流傳更廣的錯謬。

多位「中國熱」研究者曾試圖釐定這股流行之起始與終結界線，然而，受到不同

歷史因素的作用，這股風潮在各區域興衰的態勢並不一致，空間的隔閡帶來時差——如同啟蒙思想或正歌劇的風潮，於一個國度已臻鼎盛，在另一國卻姍姍來遲；於一個地區已近乎歇止，在另一處則方興未艾。即使是大一統時期的中國，文化也會有地域差異，何況分裂的西方世界？

18 世紀，義大利與德國都尚未統一，兩者的部份地域皆受到奧地利哈布斯堡皇族管轄，這正是《中國英雄》傳播、轉演的開端。時至今日，奧地利漢學反而往往為德國漢學所掩蓋：德國漢學史往往將日耳曼地區的漢學與中國風等，全劃歸於普魯士興起後才邁向統一的德國，奧地利漢學乃被嚴重邊緣化。[47]事實上，無論是萊布尼茲(Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1646－1716)或歌德(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1749－1832)，這些在討論所謂「德國」漢學或中華文化接受與再創作時必然談及的代表性人物，[48]生前尊奉的政權都不是普魯士，而是奧地利哈布斯堡。

以目前地理歸屬來研究漢學史，固為無可厚非之權宜範疇，然而，在探討古代的相關文化現象時，仍應適時關注當時的政治局勢，跳脫出後世國籍框架，方能避免偏頗。

[47] 參考：（英）傅熊(Bernhard Fuehrer)著，王艷、（德）儒丹墨(Daniel-Maurice Rubis)譯，《忘與亡：奧地利漢學史》（上海：華東師範大學出版社，2011 年）。

[48] 萊布尼茲，日耳曼哲學家，在數學史亦占有重要地位，被譽為「十七世紀的亞里斯多德」。萊布尼茲曾在書信中詳細表達對中國文化的重視，可參考：張西平主編，《萊布尼茨思想中的中國元素》(鄭州：大象出版社，2010 年)。歌德，日耳曼文學家和自然科學家，為十八世紀古典主義文學最著名的代表。歌德曾在書信和對話錄中表達對中國文學的讚美和看法，還有對中華文化的想像與仰慕，可參考：楊武能、莫光華，《歌德與中國》(成都：四川人民出版社，2017 年)。

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道作為習慣與組成：史賓諾沙式閱讀《老子》

蔡長蓁*

摘要

作為《老子》核心概念的「道」常被認為是一種方法，其形式為對衝突和對立的無動於衷，甚至有的連結《老子》和史賓諾沙哲學的文章也這麼認為。但奉行無動於衷當作方法比較是康德式而不是史賓諾沙式的倫理，且《老子》的倫理學已被指出和康德的思想不合，故筆者試著將《老子》之道想為是一種狀態，內容為習慣與組成，在這上面筆者參考的是史賓諾沙、拉維森和德勒茲的思想，其後兩者有直接或間接受到史賓諾沙哲學的影響。筆者想要發展一種不強調方法和規則，但卻比較入世的倫理學。習慣可為此倫理學之基礎，因為它是自然界中的斷片融合之後的結果，所以它同時也是組成，並且不會超越所在的環境。習慣持續存在，並體現區辨性的抹消。同樣地，《老子》之道不會有大幅度的變動，其並被表現為「復歸於無」，此「無」並非絕對的空洞，而是支撐相異事物進入和諧狀態的媒介。「為道」會導向「無為」的狀態，而「無為」可被解釋成「無區辨性之為」以及進入一個大的整體的整合。但《老子》並未告訴人如何達成「道」，正如關於習慣的知識只可得於習慣形成之後。習慣意味著道的存在，但道並不以任何特定的習慣為目的。道並不是一種實現尚未存在之物的方法，而是一種會自然產生某些效果的存在。而道也可以變成不存在，所以和史賓諾沙意義下的神並不相同，道僅為組成，但可作為史賓諾沙之「共通概念」的基礎。

關鍵詞：組成、德勒茲、習慣、老子、拉維森、史賓諾沙

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The Way as Habit and Composition: A Spinozist Reading of the *Lǎozǐ*

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Abstract

The Way of the *Lǎozǐ* has often been considered to constitute a method of indifference to conflicts or oppositions, even by works that try to relate the *Lǎozǐ* to the Spinozist tradition. Since adhering to a method of indifference is more Kantian than Spinozist and the ethics of the *Lǎozǐ* has been noted to be incompatible with that of Kant, I try to conceive the Way of the *Lǎozǐ* as a state of habit and composition, following the thoughts of Spinoza, Ravaisson, and Deleuze, the latter two having been explicitly or implicitly influenced by Spinoza. I want thereby to develop an ethics that does not put emphasis on methods or rules and that is more engaged in the actualities of the world. Habit can underlie this ethics because it is the result of fusion of segments of nature and is thus at the same time composition and does not transcend its environment. It also continues indefinitely and embodies the effacement of distinctness. Likewise the Way of the *Lǎozǐ* does not vary greatly and is expressed by a return to "nothing," which is not an absolute void but supports the coming into harmony of different things. Practicing the Way leads to a state of "no action," which can be interpreted as meaning "no distinct action" and integration into a larger whole. The *Lǎozǐ* does not tell us how to achieve the Way, just as habits are known only after they have been formed. Habit indicates the presence of the Way, but the Way does not have any particular habit as its goal. It is not a method to realize what does not yet exist, but an existence that naturally produces its effects. And since the Way can be non-existent, it is not God in Spinoza's sense, but simply composition, which serves as the basis of Spinoza's "common notions."

Keywords: composition, Deleuze, habit, *Lǎozǐ*, Ravaisson, Spinoza.

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I.

The Way of the *Lǎozǐ* is often portrayed as a policy of accepting whatever comes or being always indifferent to the conflicts going on. For example, Lài Xī-Sān in his essay on the ethics of the *Lǎozǐ* says "while to expand their own subject everyone vies with everyone and tries to assert themselves and prove others wrong, turning interpersonal relationships into power struggles, the dark virtue [玄德] ethics of the *Lǎozǐ* follows the virtue of water, which is said to be 'best [上善]' and 'non-competing [不爭]'" ("The Chaos" 23, my translation). Here the Way looks like not just an ideal state to be realized. To be non-competing we imitate something that is non-competing. The supposed "virtue of water" is the method.

If the Way requires following that method, which means leaving conflicts as they are, then the Way could be conflictual because it could entail the presence of conflicts. That is what the Way is like in Hans-Georg Moeller's description of the ethics of the *Lǎozǐ*: "Daoist sages are able to respond to the course of change with indifference: they are able to equally accept the opposing segments or phases of the movement of the Dao without being one-sidedly attached to a singular element" (102). Moeller assumes that the movement of the Way can have "opposing segments." But this would put the ethical status of the being of the Way in question, because in that case the Way could be self-contradictory. Discussing the things that are like "opposing segments" in the *Lǎozǐ*, Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall also say that "The sages do not take sides, but are catalytic in facilitating the flourishing of the process [of Way-making] as a whole" (81). Again the Way is allowed to contain contradictions. And indifference is like a method for achieving the Way.

The ethics of the *Lǎozǐ* has been contrasted with that of Kant. Lài, for instance, states,

> Daoism would not agree with transcendental moral reason in the Kantian sense, but thinks that morality is usually shaped and regulated by ideologies under linguistic systems in the context of socio-cultural experiences. Therefore [for it] human values, whether beauty/ugliness, right/wrong, superiority/inferiority, or good/evil, have in themselves no absolute transcendental essence. They are meaningful only in a linguistic, relative, and conventional way. (*Dāngdài* 215, my translation)

But if the sage is to be indifferent to these "conventional" values and to always see, accordingly, things like beauty as no better than their opposites, would not his position be precisely a transcendental one, since no earthly or "socio-cultural" stuff can touch him? Kantian ethics does promote sticking to a set of principles no matter what situation one is in. As Kant says, "what *duty* is, is plain of itself to everyone, but what brings true lasting advantage, if this is to extend to the whole of one's existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity, and much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule in accordance with it to the ends of life even tolerably, by making appropriate exceptions"

(5:36). For Kant, there is something called "duty" that is universally easy to understand and that he sets in contrast with the way to benefit one's singular existence or life, which always appears obscure. He thus sees dealing with things like "the context of socio-cultural experiences" as difficult.

Kant does not much care about establishing harmonious relationships between things and/or people. His ethics actually begins with a stance that is conflictual because it ignores the surroundings of the subject. He asserts that "all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the *determination of the will*, not with the natural conditions (of practical ability) for *carrying out its purpose*" (Kant 5:66). The Kantian perspective entails a dimension above the turbulent field of nature. This dimension influences one's actions without reference to their feasibilities. Kant also thinks that order has to be imposed from that dimension: "To substitute subjective necessity, that is, custom, for objective necessity, which is to be found only in a priori judgments, is to deny to reason the ability to judge an object, that is, to cognize it and what belongs to it" (5:12). Kant does not think that "custom" is the basis of our recognition of objects. To him without the transcendental dimension of "a priori judgments" things would be in a chaotic flux. I think it is this rejection of habit in favor of something unearthly as the source of (forced) stability that is at odds with the *Lǎozǐ*. It is not exactly "non-competing" and "taking no sides" that are at odds with Kant, since these can be turned into or based on "a priori judgments."

I understand the "custom" Kant mentions as habit because he relates it to "subjective necessity," which to him would depend on specific contexts: "a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another" (5:21). Kant means by "subjective" something always embedded and therefore always different in the sense of changing along with its circumstances. Thus his "custom" is what a subject in*habit*s. Yet he regards this thing that is actually lived as only an element for distinguishing between subjects and refuses it ethical significance in favor of "universally valid" rules that are conceived as independent of what the subject gets used to. This devalorization of habit is actually quite characteristic of a major Western tradition of ethics, which is ironic, since Aristotle says this with regard to the origin of the term "ethics": "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (*ēthikē*) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word *ethos* (habit)" (1103a). It would seem that habit precedes "moral virtue," the latter taking place as a derivation. But when it comes to the question of verifying the presence of a certain virtue (bravery), Aristotle says, "it is thought the mark of a braver man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than to be so in those that are foreseen; for it must have proceeded more from a state of character, because less from preparation; acts that are foreseen may be chosen by calculation and reason, but sudden actions must be in accordance with one's state of character" (1117a). For him character (ethos) is distinguished by emergency. Without something unhabitual as a touchstone, good and bad habits would be mixed up, since apparently virtuous acts "may be chosen by calculation and reason." Hence Aristotle's emergency plays the same role as Kant's "a priori judgments." To both of them things get confused when there is nothing but habit. And to reduce this confusion they resort to a non-habitual level from which habits are seen as just the "subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another" (Kant 5:21), and which thereby serves the purpose of affirming sameness, of assigning each thing to its place.

So an ethics at odds with habit could actually resist change. That is perhaps why Lacan says, paradoxically, "Doesn't the [Kantian] moral law represent desire in the case in which it is no longer the subject, but rather the object that is missing?" ("Kant" 659/780). If there is no desirable object to relate to, then desire becomes Kantian. The Kantian "objective necessity" actually produces only repetitions of subjective patterns, which are similar in nature to rituals, because they go on without regard for their meanings or precisely because they cannot find their meanings where they are. Certain rituals were called *lǐ* (禮) in ancient China and were celebrated by Confucians. And as Ames and Hall note, to Daoism these rituals are conflictual: "In the Daoist critique of Confucianism, it is assumed that *li* has ossified into a technical morality that, [. . .], dislocates the human community from its natural rhythms. As such, generic, institutionalized *li* [. . .] suppresses spontaneous natural habits" (53). If the Way were really made of conflict (in the form of oppositions, segments, etc.) and indifference to conflict, as some scholars have suggested, would not the Daoists have welcomed rituals as well? That is because rituals are just like that. They cannot enter harmonious relationships but, unfazed, they go on nevertheless. To avoid contradiction in Daoism, we should say more about the other candidate for the stuff of the Way, namely habit. And to do that I choose to follow the Spinozist tradition of non-transcendental ethics, because the portrayal below of Spinoza by Deleuze reads like an affirmation of Daoism and a critique of *lǐ* or ritual:

> This frugal, propertyless life, undermined by illness, this thin, frail body, this brown, oval face with its sparkling black eyes – how does one explain the impression they give of being suffused with Life itself, of having a power identical to Life? In his whole way of living and of thinking, Spinoza projects an image of the positive, affirmative life, which stands in opposition to the semblances that men are content with. Not only are they content with the latter, they feel a hatred of life, they are ashamed of it; a humanity bent on self-destruction, multiplying the cults of death, bringing about the union of the tyrant and the slave, the priest, the judge, and the soldier, always busy running life into the ground, mutilating it, killing it outright or by degrees, overlaying it or suffocating it with laws, properties, duties, empires – this is what Spinoza diagnoses in the world, this betrayal of the universe and of mankind. (*Spinoza* 12)

Deleuze here begins with an almost Daoist description of the person of Spinoza, emphasizing his apparent weakness. How can this weakness be a vessel for power? Simply by not practicing any "betrayal of the universe and of mankind," namely of "natural rhythms" and "spontaneous natural habits." Deleuze thinks that to Spinoza things like laws and duties are little better than "cults of death" "overlaid" on life. These things are imposed from a level other than the one we live on, just like Kantian morality. They create discord and pain but people are nevertheless addicted to them. Though Deleuze does not say why they are, it may be due to the effect of something like the Kantian "plain duty" as a false easy way out. Developing habits and becoming one with one's environment is harder than submitting to rituals and alienation. People tend to choose the latter even though they give but a "semblance" of order, just as there are those who seek the hallucinations produced by drugs (addiction is also called habit in English, though)[1].

Habit is perhaps the most common thing in life that is neither ritual nor disorder. Félix Ravaisson, one of the Western philosophers more receptive to habit, claims in his *Of Habit*,

> what we especially intend by the word 'habit', which is the subject of this study, is not simply acquired habit, but habit that is contracted, owing to a change, with respect to the very change that gave birth to it.
>
> Now, once acquired, habit is a general, permanent way of being, and if change is transitory, habit subsists beyond the change which brought it about. Moreover, if it is related, insofar as it is habit and by its very essence, only to the change that engendered it, then habit remains for a change which either is no longer or is not yet; it remains for a possible change. This is its defining characteristic. Habit is not, therefore, merely a state, but a disposition, a virtue. (25)

Ravaisson here amounts to saying that habit is essentially open to difference. It always exists in between changes. That is, a habit has to change when its environment changes. Though it is called "permanent," it is stable only temporarily. Ravaisson considers change the origin of habit. Does this mean habit necessarily begins with some sort of alienation? No, because if something changes, it does not always change into something less compatible with you. And to Ravaisson the change that gives rise to habit is precisely a stabilization into things one can relate to: "In order to constitute a real existence where habit can take root, there must be a real unity; there must, therefore, be something within the infinity of matter that, in one form or another, constitutes unity, identity" (27). Of course unity and

[1] Though in this paper I see habit as a state of harmony, in the West the word "habit" never refers simply to a state. As Clare Carlisle notes, habit is both "aptitude and tendency," and she uses the "pathway" as a metaphor for habit: "a pathway both facilitates a journey across rough terrain, and inclines us to take a particular route" (23). The former function of the pathway is like the supporting of a harmonious state while the latter lies in the direction of addiction. Though Carlisle's metaphor coincides in name with the Way of Daoism, the Chinese word for habit is seldom used to mean addiction. Rather, it often serves as a verb meaning "to get used to." In this sense, if you are no longer or not yet used to something, there is no habit or harmonious state comprising you and that thing, and if addiction usually leads to the unbearable, it actually destroys habit (it is the failure to form habit). Inflected by the Chinese language, I therefore lean towards the "static" sense of the word "habit," which, of course, does not mean that habits are directionless, but that a habit comes into existence only when the inclinations leading to its formation have died down or at least gone out of consciousness.

identity have become controversial concepts now. But here they are just part of "the infinity of matter." That is, they are the part of nature that has become recognizable. To the extent that they stand out, they are not yet habits. The development of habit works towards the effacement of their distinctness: "In the progress of habit, [. . .] The interval that the understanding represents between the movement and the goal gradually diminishes; the distinction is effaced; the end whose idea gave rise to the inclination comes close to it, touches it and becomes fused with it" (Ravaisson 55). It should be pointed out that habit is not a neutral or indifferent state. It comes from an "inclination" becoming one with its "goal." The recognized unity or change that a habit is based on is something good and worth pursuing, but not in the sense of a transcendental ideal to be realized. It is rather comparable to a new gadget that we have to learn how to use in order to make it an extension of our body. As Ravaisson says, "habit is not an external necessity of constraint, but a necessity of attraction and desire" (57). Remaining indifferent no matter what happens cannot become a habit and is more like a transcendental duty imposed from without the world we live in. Ravaisson would suggest we drop such a way of life that amounts to "constraint" and develop our inner "attraction and desire."

Deleuze in his discussion on repetition also devotes a part to habit. There he can be said to broaden Ravaisson's theory. To Deleuze, the "real unity" Ravaisson's habit grows from would already count as habit, passively formed out of "the infinity of matter." I think Deleuze gives more leeway to the compositional or combinatory aspect of habit. In Ravaisson this aspect is just the fusion of "the movement and the goal." But it can be more complicated. One habit comes together with another or many others, for example. Deleuze delineates his theory thus:

> Passive synthesis [. . .] constitutes our habit of living, our expectation that 'it' will continue, that one of the two elements [like in the tick-tock of a clock or the ba-dump of a heart] will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetuation of our *case*. When we say that habit is a contraction we are speaking not of an instantaneous action which combines with another to form an element of repetition, but rather of the fusion of that repetition in the contemplating mind. A soul must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whose entire function is to contract a habit. This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. (*Difference* 74)

Here, a habit is itself already a composition. It is born of drawing together certain physical potentials (the "soul") and the environment. And if the environment includes distinct elements, such as a ticking or "an instantaneous action," they may lose their distinctness through "passive synthesis" and become part of a rhythm that goes on and on.

Deleuze expands the usual meaning of habit to include things like breathing and heartbeats. In this view we are made up of habits that cannot be separated. Without heartbeats we die. And a heartbeat would not be a heartbeat if it had only “ba” but no “dump.” A fact like this, since it is too ordinary to merit attention, is neither “plain of itself to everyone” nor “veiled in impenetrable obscurity” (Kant 5:36). It just exists. The passivity from which habit results means that there is a gap between the formation of habits and our intentional, active efforts to form them. If synthesis is composition, we are then reminded of one of Deleuze’s comments on Spinoza: “We have no *a priori* knowledge of relations of composition; they require experimentation” (*Spinoza* 116-17, n. 12). One can acquire the knowledge of a habit only after the fact. So such knowledge cannot serve as a method for the making of new habits.

A habit is a good state insofar as it lasts, insofar as it is a successful composition. And Spinoza and the theorists of habit mentioned here suggest that we begin with this good and work (experimentally) towards greater good (not recoiling to indifference or ritual). To be sure, Spinoza does not foreground habit in his work.[2] But we can see therein habit and its compositionality, like in this passage from his magnum opus, *Ethics*:

> The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and we attend solely to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and violently moves the whole arm downwards, is a virtue which is conceived in accordance with the structure of the human body. So if a man, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to clenching his fist or moving his arm, this happens [. . .] because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things. (E4P59S)

“The action of striking” can be seen as a habit contracted by the “souls,” namely physical potentials, of a human body. Spinoza even describes it in a “tick-tock” fashion, that is, in segments. The fusion of the three segments by our body establishes something good, a “virtue” in the form of a reproducible action. And this action can enter different relations. Deleuze comments on this passage thus: “The same act [of striking in beating someone up] would have been good if it had been associated with the image of a thing whose relation agreed with it (e.g., hammering iron). Which means that an act is bad whenever it directly

2 Carlisle thinks that Spinoza’s attitude towards habit is ambivalent (53). “On the one hand, [. . .] Spinoza advocates a reordering of thought from the fortuitous sequence of experience, which generates habit, to the logical and causal order that constitutes knowledge. But on the other hand, he invokes the mechanism of habit – that is, the repeated association of ideas – to explain how our thinking can be reordered in accordance with rational principles. [. . .] Left to itself, habit leads people away from the truth, but in the hands of the philosopher it becomes an instrument for cultivating wisdom” (Carlisle 54-55). I would say that the habit supposedly rejected by Spinoza is more like a misperception of habit: we often see certain things appear together so we imagine a harmonious relationship between them while there is in fact none. On the other hand, Deleuze’s idea of the habit-forming “contemplative soul” (*Difference* 74) suggests that the making of habits requires rational thinking, even if this thinking is not conscious. That is, habits have to follow “the logical and causal order” of nature (which is not the same as some preconceived road map on our part) and not anything can be synthesized with anything to constitute a habit. And one of the basic rules of nature asserted by Spinoza, the conatus, which is not discussed by Carlisle, can serve as the basis of habit, as I will show below.

decomposes a relation, whereas it is good whenever it directly compounds its relation with other relations" (*Spinoza* 35). A habit is already a relation that is infinitely segmentable. The striking in question here can be 24 frames rather than 3 in a film. But the segmentation is not real, since real segmentation means decomposition and thus at least obstruction of habit, which may happen, however, during a fight, when your raised arm is held in the air by the opponent so that it cannot proceed to the next step, or when you are injured so bad that you cannot move. In hammering iron, on the other hand, your habit of striking can continue. Though fatigue may stop you, what you make is another good that can enter other relations. Thus the virtue of striking is here indefinitely expandable. And this comes from the ability of the habit in question to exist and to combine.

Ravaisson says that "the disposition of which habit consists, and the principle engendering it, are one and the same thing: this is the primordial law and the most general form of being, the tendency to persevere in the very actuality that constitutes being" (77). For some reason Ravaisson does not cite Spinoza.[3] But for those familiar with the earlier philosopher, the reference is unmistakable. To Ravaisson habit is made of conatus, the most common power of existence. Spinoza defines conatus in this way: "The endeavour to preserve itself is simply the essence of a thing [. . .], which, in so far as it exists as such, is conceived to have a force of perseverance in existing [. . .] and of doing those things that follow necessarily from its given nature" (E4P26D). Conatus literally means "striving." But it is not necessarily a conscious striving. It exists wherever there is existence. And it does not strive to attain an external goal but to realize the "nature" of the existing thing that has it. Therefore conatus is more like a state of continuity than a method to achieve something. However it is not an invariable state because things come from the outside to change it. About those things, Spinoza understands the good ones as those that affect us with joy/pleasure and the bad ones as those giving us sadness/pain. To be more precise, good things strengthen our conatus and bad things weaken it. In Spinoza, conatus is also a "capacity to be affected": an "emotion [affect] that is called a passive state of the mind is [something] by which the mind affirms of its body, or of any part of its body, a greater or less force of existing than before" (E3General Definition of the Emotions). Spinoza defines our activity as things caused fully by us and our passivity as those that are not (E3D2). Simply put, the former comes from inside of an existence and the latter from outside. Our passive emotions aka passions are necessarily born of encounters with the external world. And an existence, unless it is as great as the whole of nature, has to cope with these encounters. Deleuze says, "Spinoza's project is [. . .] realized not by suppressing all passion, but by the aid of joyful passions restricting passions to the smallest part of ourselves, so that our capacity to be affected is exercised by a maximum of active affections" (*Expressionism*

[3] Ravaisson (1813 - 1900) studied under Schelling (1775 - 1854), who was noted for using Spinoza's theories.

285). That is to say, Spinoza's ethics is not one that thinks of the external world as totally alien and to be rejected. Rather, it sees it as full of potentials for expanding one's conatus through good encounters. If we succeed in integrating us with something good we meet, that thing becomes internal to us and capable of producing active affects.[4] Spinoza's project is this kind of relation building and he calls the true knowledge of a relation a "common notion." According to Deleuze's understanding of Spinoza: "Common notions are always the idea of that in which bodies agree with one another; they agree under this or that relation which is established between varying numbers of bodies" (*Spinoza* 115). If habits are compositions, they are represented by common notions. And if they are conatus, they are states of continuity to be affected by the outside world. So if something is understood as habit, it cannot be depicted as "opposing segments" or as a stance of indifference.[5]

II.

Fù Wěi-Xūn is perhaps among the earliest to have compared the *Lǎozǐ* and Spinoza. But for him the Way is something comparable to Spinoza's God or the whole of nature:[6]

> To both [the *Lǎozǐ* and Spinoza], reality and appearance, the absolute and the relative, or the like, are but the head and tail of the same coin. In terms of the ontological totality, things-as-they-are are unified into the non-differentiated Tao (non-being) or *Natura Naturans* (God); and in terms of differentiated manifestations, they are called being (including ten thousand things) or *Natura Naturata* (including infinite and finite modes). (390)

For Fù Wěi-Xūn, the Way would be always already existing, and just perceived or realized in different ways. But as Chapter 46 of the *Lǎozǐ* (discussed near the end of this paper) shows, the Way can be absent, and understanding the Way thus depends on presence of the Way, not the other way around. Fù Wěi-Xūn's approach may contribute to a stance of indifference, since if the Way already included everything, there would be no need to "practice the Way" (featured in Chapters 15, 48 and 65 of the *Lǎozǐ*, which are discussed below). Fù Wěi-Xūn does not see the ethical practice of making compositions as another possible intersection of the *Lǎozǐ* and Spinoza. More recently, Tatsiana Silantsyeva, also seeing the *Lǎozǐ* in a Spinozist light (that of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza), has nevertheless

4 This is summed up by Hasana Sharp as follows: "Human action is not an individual exercise but the consequence of an enabling affective milieu, comprising infinitely many human and nonhuman forces" (34). In Spinoza, seeking to realize one's own nature and produce "action" is inseparable from the task of dealing with the infinite nature that contains one and from which one cannot escape.

5 A reader reminds me that Lài Xī-Sān thinks there is mysticism in both the *Lǎozǐ* and Spinoza (*Dāngdài* 255-58; "Sībīnnuòshā" 90-91). And mysticism paradoxically both asserts speechlessness and describes mystic experiences in terms of contradictions (Lài, *Dāngdài* 257-58). This may seem similar to the stance of indifference I have been referring to. But insofar as mysticism tries to use language to express its unspeakable experiences, it is not indifferent but seeks to connect the in-different (the unity of apparently contradictory things) to everyday habits of thinking and speaking.

6 Fù Pèi-Róng in his essay comparing Spinoza and the *Lǎozǐ* tries to make the same point (42).

made this observation: "the *Dao De Jing* invents a method, even an ethics, of attaining the highest power of impassivity within the infinite flow of interpretation which corresponds to our habit of imposing names and proliferating meanings" (364). Silantsyeva opposes "impassivity" to a flux that is at the same time habitual, just as Kant does with his "a priori judgments" (5:12). I think this is another version of remaining indifferent as practicing the Way. But the *Lǎozǐ* in fact promotes going along with the flow rather than resisting it or standing beyond it: the sage (the *Lǎozǐ*'s ideal person) "returns to what the masses pass by" (ch. 64, *Lao-Tzu* 150), "teaches what others teach" (ch. 42, *Lǎozǐ* 37, my translation), "constantly has no (set) mind," and "takes the mind of the common people as his mind" (ch. 49, *Lao-Tzu* 120). The *Lǎozǐ* promotes fusion and composition, with habit as material. And I do not see how Silantsyeva's habit-rejecting "method" is compatible with this. The content of her "method" is "impassivity" or even "immobilization," by which we supposedly can and have to "freeze the circulation of immediate meanings" (Silantsyeva 364). If this is to "practice the Way," then the Way conceived here would be nothing but disruption of composition and exclusion of affects. And the "method" in question would thus be anti-Spinozist. Strangely, however, this kind of thing is not only a likely effect of identifying the Way with Spinoza's God (as suggested by Fù Wěi-Xūn's lamenting as "unnecessary" Spinoza's attempt to express "his unique personal realization" with conventional formulae (390)), but also in line with the stereotypical understanding of the famous "nonaction" of Daoism, namely as an injunction to do nothing politically, or even to run away from society.

III.

According to Jullien in his comparison of Western and Chinese philosophies,

> **far from advocating disengagement from human affairs and from the world, the nonaction [無為] of the *Laozi* teaches one how to behave in this world in order to be successful. For one thing at least is clear by default: this Daoist thinker could never invite us to flee this world, since, as he sees it, there is no other in the name of which to reject this one, in the hope of which to trust, and the expectation of which might make this life endurable. (85)**

Jullien recognizes little room for indifference or "disengagement" in the world of the *Lǎozǐ*, but he still treats "nonaction" as teaching us "how to behave," that is, like a method. I think nonaction denotes a successful state rather than a guiding principle. It is because things are going well that you do not need to do anything in particular, and not the other way around. The text in question is Chapter 48, the first half of which already appears in the Guōdiàn *Lǎozǐ*, the earliest version of the *Lǎozǐ* found so far (dating from about 300 B.C., middle to late Warring States Period):

Those who (toil at) their studies increase day after day; 學者日益
Those who practice the Way, decrease day after day. 為道者日損
They decrease and decrease, 損之又損
Until they reach the point of nonaction. 以至無為也
They carry out no action, yet there is nothing left undone. 無為而無不為
(Henricks B:2, translation modified)

I choose to analyze the Guōdiàn version here because in the standard version the character "者" ("those who") is missing from the first two lines (see *Lǎozǐ* 41**) and as a result we are left uncertain about exactly what "increases" or "decreases." And in the Mǎwángduī version, the earliest full-length version on record, the central part ("無為而無不為") has rotten away and "聞" ("to hear") is substituted for "為" ("to practice") in the second line (***Lao-Tzu* 119**), thus foregrounding a passivity in relation to the Way and denying us an opportunity to explore the subtlety of the use of the character "為" in the *Lǎozǐ*.**

Jullien comments on Chapter 48 thus:

> **Taken as a whole, the formula [無為而無不為] means not just that nonaction does not exclude effectiveness, but even that it is by refraining from action (knowing not to act) that we can best bring about what we desire. At this stage (where 'there is nothing that is left undone'), the double negative in advance eliminates the possibility that the future result might be limited or incomplete, and guarantees it total success. (86)**

The understanding of "無不為" as "total success" is in fact an old one. It is even suggested by Wáng Bì, the famous early Chinese commentator of the *Lǎozǐ*, **whose note to the line "無為而無不為" reads: "If there is action, there is loss. Therefore having no action means doing everything" (***Lǎozǐ* 41, my translation**). The logical problem here is that the proposition "if there is action, there is loss" does not lead to "if there is no action, there is no loss." Wáng Bì inserts an implication or causality between "no action" and "nothing left undone." And Jullien goes further by inserting time: for him "nothing left undone" is "the future result" and the realization of "what we desire," thus introducing more clearly than Wáng Bì the logic of means and end. However, no-action or nonaction is in my view at the same time "there is nothing left undone." The logical relation between them is closer to conjunction or "and/but" than to "if ... then," because "and/but" is what we usually translate the character "而" as. And what the text of this chapter of the *Lǎozǐ* says is literally that we reach "no action" through "practicing the Way." So "no action" seems more like a state or effect than a principle or cause. I would like to compare it to an organism or machine that functions well, in which "there is nothing left undone" because everything is done automatically, as with an acquired habit. If we must have the idea of a guiding principle (a means and end), then it would appear from the text itself that the Way, equivalent to "no action" and**

"nothing left undone," is the end, rather than "no action" being the means and "nothing left undone" being the goal.

The means required by the Way, if there is any, is not clear. As Móu Zōng-Sān says, the *Lǎozǐ* "does not provide methods on the level of knowledge" **and its discourse is "paradoxical" rather than "analytical" (139, my translation).**[7] The *Lǎozǐ* **does not tell us, at least in Chapter 48, how to "practice the Way." It just states that those who do so will "decrease and decrease." And when they have shrunk to a certain degree, they suddenly, paradoxically coincide with the all-powerful "nothing left undone" state. To solve this mystery, we may need to look more closely at the character "為" (to practice/do/act), since its meaning is directly related to the question of "what to do" and it appears in Chapter 48 both in the description of the supposedly perfect state and in that of the process leading to the said state. "為," when pronounced *wéi*, can be either a noun or a verb. The "為" in "practice the Way [為道]" or "nothing left undone [無不為]" is a verb while the one in "no action [無為]" is a noun. Since "無 [no]" is generally followed by nouns and "不 [not]" by verbs or adjectives, I would like to render "無為而無不為", somewhat awkwardly, as "no action, but no not acting either." Rather than rejecting activity, the** *Lǎozǐ* **affirms "為" as the verb "to act" as the material of the ideal state it proclaims (if we can even speak of "ideals" in the Eastern tradition). To "practice the Way" would mean, then, to act and act until your actions can no longer be properly described with nouns.**[8] **According to the Mǎwángduī *Lǎozǐ*, "The one who was skilled at practicing the Way in antiquity" is depicted in this manner:**

> **Scattered and dispersed was he! Like ice as it melts.**
> **Genuine, unformed was he! Like uncarved wood.**
> **Merged, undifferentiated was he! Like muddy water.**
> **Broad and expansive was he! Like a valley. (ch. 15,** *Lao-Tzu* 216)

"為" also functions as a copula, so in addition to "practicing the Way," "為道"

[7] For Móu Zōng-Sān, Daoism explains the Way "on the level of effects" (126, my translation). And the Way can be seen as a "subjective state of mind" achieved through "practice" (Móu 128-30, my translation). Like Móu, I consider the Way to be a state, effected through no clearly defined method. But I find Móu's emphasis on the Way as "subjective" and mental strange. He even claims that Daoism does not talk about objective existences at all (Móu 102). Would not this exclusive focus upon subjectivity justify making the practitioner of the Way "increase" (see the discussion of Chapter 48 in this paper) so as to include everything and thus contradict what the *Lǎozǐ* says? Fully exploring this question is beyond the scope of this paper. But I would like to mention that for Wú Rǔ-Jūn, Móu's view makes seeing the Way as an "objective metaphysical substance" impossible and opens the way for rooting "existences" in "mutual connections" (262, my translation), which is not unlike the Spinozism I follow here.

[8] A reader has pointed out that Móu Zōng-Sān sees the character "無" here as a verb. It would then mean to annul or cancel. Rather than "no action," "無為" would be understood as "to reject things that are limited, hypocritical, contrived, superficial, perfunctory" (Móu 90, my translation). This makes sense in the context of the *lǐ* institutions, valued by Confucians, degenerating into "empty shells" during the Spring-Autumn Warring States Period (Móu 89, my translation). Though this interpretation is not irrelevant to the dissolution of distinct actions in Chapter 48, reading "無" as a verb does not quite fit into the flow of the text of the chapter, where "無為" is more like a state reached than an act or injunction.

also translates as "being the Way" and the best Way-practitioner may be said to equal the Way. The Way as "no not acting" or the person who has achieved this state cannot be sufficiently represented by nouns. That is why the above noun phrases like "ice as it melts" are all preceded by "like." The Way is necessarily uncertain in relation to nouns/names. It overflows them, not to mention the things depicting it here all have qualities of overflowing or indistinctness: "as it melts," "uncarved," "muddy," and "expansive." Given that "為道" works to reach a "merged, undifferentiated" and "broad" state, we may have an inkling of what the *Lǎozǐ* means by "decrease and decrease" in Chapter 48, though this is never put explicitly. Does not the Way practitioner keep becoming smaller because they are being integrated into a larger whole? The Mǎwángduī *Lǎozǐ* speaks of the "mutual formation of long and short" as one of the "constants" (ch. 2, *Lao-Tzu* 190**). So of course "increase" and "decrease" can be a matter of comparison. In this light, I think the first line of Chapter 48 says that scholars "increase day after day" because they take knowledge into themselves and therefore grow bigger with regard to the knowledge they used to have. Those who "practice the Way," on the other hand, are taken into something larger than themselves so they appear diminished. After that integration, they continue to act, but things are done by the whole they are in. That is why "no not acting" is the same as "nothing left undone." The Way composes activities to make a state in which things are being done, and it composes them so well that none of them is a distinct "action" or segment.**

Ames and Hall may be thinking about the "decrease and decrease" of Chapter 48 when they say, "The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. [. . .] Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one's own developing disposition" (38). I think Ames and Hall, like many others, treat what is an effect or state in the *Lǎozǐ* as an ethical principle. They seem to see something like to "decrease" as a method in the form of "deference" rather than as a natural result of being integrated into the Way. As in Chapter 48, the *Lǎozǐ* does *describe* what "one's own developing disposition" is like, but it does not *prescribe* its rules. Assuming the *Lǎozǐ* is telling us what we *should* do is dangerous, because it brings back the ghost of the good old oriental despotism. For this matter, let us look at this notorious chapter, which is also about "practicing the Way":

Those good at practicing the Way in antiquity
did not use it to enlighten the people
but would [將] use it to make them stupid.
The people are difficult to rule
because they have too much intelligence [智].
Therefore using intelligence to rule a country

damages the country;
not using intelligence to rule a country
blesses the country. (ch. 65, *Lǎozǐ* 57, my translation)

Reading this chapter as a kind of guidance would turn it into something like a justification for dictatorial regimes that try to keep their people ignorant. For example, Yanaka Shinichi, commenting on this and many other chapters, says, "it is better to think of the canonization of the *Lǎozǐ* as ultimately something formed by the demands for methodologies on how to achieve the unification of China and on how to rule after that unification" (252, my translation). That is, the *Lǎozǐ* would like to turn people into zombies, either as mindless fighting machines in war or as submissive workers in peace. But nowhere in the *Lǎozǐ* can we learn the black magic that would do the trick. This absence of "methods," let alone "methodologies," which has already been pointed out by Móu Zōng-Sān (139; see the earlier discussion), should stop us from jumping to conclusions. Not only does the *Lǎozǐ* not tell us how to deter people from pursuing knowledge or becoming intelligent, but it also condemns "using intelligence to rule a country," thus precluding the devising of deterrents or other means, which can only be an exercise of intelligence. Moreover, the character "將" in the third line of Chapter 65 which I translate as "would" carries little of the meaning of volition and points rather to a future state of affairs, so Chapter 65 does not so much say that "Those good at practicing the Way" use the Way as a means or method to achieve stupidity, as that stupidity naturally results from the establishment of the Way. Besides, though in the second and third lines of the translation there is the pronoun "it" for the Way, which appears as a means there, this pronoun is missing in the original text. Though this kind of omission is not unusual in classical Chinese, in Chapter 65 it sets off the fact that the character "智," translated as "intelligence," is not only not omitted, but also not replaced by a pronoun throughout its repetitions, which gives a sense of redundancy, as if intelligence as a means in dealing with the people could not be integrated into a process and kept sticking out. We might add that the condemnation of "using intelligence" follows from the idea that "The people are difficult to rule / because they have too much intelligence," as if "using intelligence" would increase its presence. This calls to mind the "increase" of the scholars in **Chapter 48, which contrasts the development of intelligence or knowledge with "**practicing the Way,**" the latter leading to the lack of distinct actions. The success at fusion and the absence of means in the case of the Way, when seen together with how "intelligence" functions, would then suggest that** the Way of the *Lǎozǐ* is a good state of habit and composition rather than a method. And I would say it is not a method consisting in indifference and decomposition/opposition.

The *Lǎozǐ* puts a series of "opposing segments" (Moeller 102) on a par with "confusion" rather than the Way:

Fortune depends on disaster,
disaster hides in fortune.

Who knows the finale of this?
It has no normalcy.
The normal again becomes abnormal,
the good again becomes evil.
The confusion of the people
has lasted long indeed.
Therefore the sage is square but does not cut,
is incorruptible but not harsh,
straightforward but not provocative,
luminous but not glaring. (ch. 58, *Lǎozǐ* 50, my translation)

The sage, who presumably follows the Way, does have distinct positive qualities like being "square" and so on. But they are not so distinct as to become real segments. The sage "does not cut." He exists in a sort of continuity which does not have sharp rises and falls like those that make up an undulating series of fortunes and disasters.

In other words, creating extremities unbalances the Way rather than contributing to it. For example, the *Lǎozǐ* unambiguously condemns the affluence of the ruling class:

The courts are swept very clean;
While the fields are full of weeds;
And the granaries are all empty.
Their clothing – richly embroidered and colored;
While at their waists they carry sharp swords.
They gorge themselves on food, and of possessions and goods *they have plenty*.
This is called thievery!
And thievery certainly isn't *the Way*! (ch. 53, *Lao-Tzu* 128)

If good things are overly concentrated in a few hands, they will become evil. What has risen too high is in for a plummeting. The exploitative ruler finds himself reduced to a thief. And this reversal is explicitly denied the title of the Way, though the *Lǎozǐ* may appear to endorse a cyclic view of history like the belief that "Fortune depends on disaster, / disaster hides in fortune." The *Lǎozǐ* gives the impression of the Way as made up of "opposing segments" perhaps mainly because of the first line of this chapter:

Return is movement of the Way;
The weak is of use to the Way.
Everything in the world arises from existence,
existence arises from nothing. (ch. 40, *Lǎozǐ* 35, my translation)

It is possible to read the first line as meaning that the return from disaster to fortune and vice versa embodies the Way. Henricks' translation of it as "'Reversal' is the movement of the Tao" (*Lao-Tzu* 104) would support this reading. But the chapter does not tell us exactly what this "return [反]" is. And if we look at the other three lines of it, we would get the feeling that what the Way returns to is not some clear-cut part but the inchoate, or the not-yet: "The weak [弱]" and "nothing [無],"[9] which, if they are not some abstract concepts but real entities, can be consistent with habit, since Ravaisson says that habit "remains for a change which either is no longer or is not yet" (25). If in Chapter 40, "nothing" logically or temporally precedes "existence" and an infinity of variations qua "everything in the world," it is a state in which change "is not yet." And if "everything in the world" can be traced back to "nothing," then all "return" is likely to go in that direction as well. Finally, if from a "return" to "nothing" we can infer the presence of the Way, can we do the same from the presence of habit, of a "stupid" state of continuity that does not undulate greatly?

Daoist nothingness is not transcendental. In fact, the only chapter in the *Lǎozǐ* that can be said to define this concept in detail fully relates it to an everyday, habitual world:

> Thirty spokes unite in one hub;
> It is precisely where there is nothing, that we find the wheel's use [用].
> We fire clay and make vessels;
> It is precisely where there is nothing, that we find clay vessels' use.
> We chisel out doors and windows;
> It is precisely where there is nothing, that we find the room's use. (ch. 11, *Lao-Tzu* 208-09, translation modified)

This is where I base my translation of a line from Chapter 40 as "The weak is of use [用] to the Way." Weakness can be equated with nothingness in the *Lǎozǐ* because the latter is far from absolute nothingness. Chapter 11 calls "nothing [無]" what is actually a relative lack of obstruction. It might as well be called softness or liquidity, depending on the situation. **When we think back on Spinoza and Deleuze's discussions of the habit of striking, we can find a nothingness like the *Lǎozǐ*'s at work there, too. To avoid decomposition and reach completion, an act of striking has to move through the air. And in the productive case of hammering iron, what is struck has to have malleability. In a sense, habit does return to a state of Daoist "nothing." The development of a habit works, through Ravaissonian fusion or Deleuzian synthesis, towards the reduction of the presence of "something," turning this "something" into an inseparable part of the habit. Habit founders if "something" obtrudes itself. For example, if we take the wheel in Chapter 11 and glue it to its axle, then it would no longer be a wheel but just "thirty spokes [that] unite in one hub."[10] Chapter 11 is written in a way that makes**

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[9] JeeLoo Liu considers the "nothing" in the *Lǎozǐ* a "formless something" and says that "Daoist cosmogony, at least in its original version, does not endorse the hypothesis that there was initially an absolute cosmic void" (181-82), which is corroborated by these beginning lines from Chapter 25: "There was something formed out of chaos, / That was born before Heaven and Earth" (*Lao-Tzu* 236). The original "nothing" is more like nothing distinct and is continuous with "something."

[10] My view is similar to Douglas L. Berger's reading of Wáng Bì's notes on Chapter 11: "Just collecting spokes, [. . .] does not make a wheel, nor does merely throwing different kinds of clay together haphazardly give us a vase. Instead, it is how these material things are arranged around 'nothing,' or, more concretely, how spaces are built into them, that makes them into identifiably functional things" (Berger 176). But I put more emphasis on the intimate relation between this "nothing" and the habitual use of the things in question.

nothingness coincide with fusion or synthesis. If the sentences containing the word "nothing" were removed, we would have only mentions of fragments of the things in question. And those things do not appear in the text independent of their "use." So their appearance qua completed artifacts "precisely where there is nothing**" is at the same time their disappearance, not into their real segments but into the "nothing" of the habitual use associated with them. In the language of habit, then, once the contraction of distinct elements reach a state of nothingness qua non-obstrcution, a distinct habit shows up but immediately begins to fade out of consciousness so as to continue its existence smoothly. If habit always goes back to a nothingness like that of the *Lǎozǐ*, we can indeed see in habit "**movement of the Way" (ch. 40, *Lǎozǐ* 35, my translation).

Finally, Chapter 46 is a chapter that positively presents the Way as a good state of habit and composition:

When the Way exists in the world,
racehorses are released to make manure.
When the Way is absent from the world,
warhorses are bred in the countryside. (*Lǎozǐ* 40, my translation)

The Way is good in the sense that it increases rather than decreases conatus or the power of existence. Here the Way brings it about that horses just have to eat and defecate to benefit farmers, thus facilitating the continuation of both parties. This depiction of the world having the Way is a common notion, the idea of the combination of two habits. On the other hand, when the world does not have the Way, warhorses, which are for killing people and thus destroying conatus, are produced. As discussed earlier, habit is based on conatus, so using horses for war, like employing the act of striking in fistfights, is antithetical to habit. Besides, the lines about the Way-less world are written in a way that deviates from the habitual parallelism of classical Chinese. Normally we would expect something like "warhorses are bred to conquer nations" for the fourth line. While breaking habit with its form, in content that line as it is also does not put the horses into any mutually benefiting relationship with other things. It thus does not proclaim composition either. Way-less-ness like this has been noted by Thomas Michael, who believes that there is something like paradise lost and paradise regained in early Daoism, of which the *Lǎozǐ* is a representative text, and who describes the early Daoist world-historical view thus: "A less than perfect harmony stands between the first- and second-order harmonies, and this is a partial, fractured, and fragile harmony caused by the intentional activities of human beings" (70). Does not the partial parallelism of the lines about the Way-less world in Chapter 46 embody precisely the flawed harmony pointed out by Michael? Having read that this fallen world (if we may call it that) is brought about by "intentional activities," we may notice that the habit and composition in the world having the Way are not what was originally intended, since the racehorses are not released to compete with each other. Warhorses in the Way-less world can, on the contrary, stand for pure intentions. They are still "in the countryside" and not deployed in battle. Yet they bespeak future wars. Intentions like these are part and parcel of methods. Jullien tells us that the "**Western method [. . .] is a 'way' to be 'pursued' that leads 'toward' something" (33).** With a method, we more or less know what is going to happen. But the Way may assume unexpected forms. The Way as a realized state of habit and composition can be unprecedented. Let me quote again Deleuze's comment on Spinoza: "We have no *a priori* knowledge of relations of composition; they require experimentation" (*Spinoza* 116-17, n. 12). This appears to be illustratable by Chapter 46 of the *Lǎozǐ*, where the Way as composition looks like something done experimentally and where "*a priori* knowledge" in the form of weapons that lead to death and destruction populates indifferently the Way-less world.

IV.

In a sense this paper is also an experiment. A reader has told me that comparing ideas from two traditions that have hardly interacted with each other in history is a tough job. Each tradition seems to bind its ideas within its own logic. On the other hand, we live in an age where texts from different traditions are easily available. When we encounter a copresence of different systems, we face an ethical choice: to remain indifferent to the disjunction between them or to make the connection on our own. Those who opt for the latter usually go for the central concepts of the systems in question. For example, the Way is compared to Spinoza's God or Nature (see Section II of this paper). I have taken another path and related the Way to two relatively marginal concepts in the Spinozist tradition: habit and composition, because I think central concepts are well established, being what all the other ideas in a system refer to and therefore more tightly bound than others. Trying to compare two central concepts from two traditions directly is therefore like flying from the peak of one mountain to that of another. A degree of airiness is unavoidable, as when a gap opens between the Way as a state and the necessary existence of God. Sometimes travelling downhill is a better way to make connections, because there is no telling who or what you will meet on your way. **After all, the *Lǎozǐ* says, "journey of a thousand miles / begins underfoot" (ch. 64,** *Lǎozǐ* 56, my translation**).**

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